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Authoritarian Constitutionalism 
Mark Tushnet1 
 
I. Introduction 
Within days of the Singapore parliamentary election in May 2011, Lee Kuan Yew and 
Goh Chok Tong announced that they had decided to leave the nation’s Cabinet, where they had 
been serving as “Minister Mentor” and “Senior Minister,” positions created for them as former 
Prime Ministers.2 The reason was that the People’s Action Party (PAP), which Lee Kuan Yew 
had founded with others in the 1950s and which had governed the nation since its separation 
                                                 
1 William Nelson Cromwell Professor of Law, Harvard Law School. I thank William Alford, 
Rosalind Dixon, Vicki Jackson, Jack Lee, H.K.M. Ewing-Chow, Rahul Sagar, Li-Ann Thio, 
Arun Kumar Thiruvengadam, and Po Jen Yap for comments on a draft, and participants at 
workshops at the University of Georgia Law School, Cornell Law School, New York University 
Law School, and Rutgers-Camden Law School for their comments. Geoffrey Curfman, now 
Research Intern in the Middle East Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, 
and Al-Amyn Sumar provided important research assistance at an earlier stage of the project, as 
did --- at later stages. 
2 See Shamim Adam, “Lee Kuan Yew Ends Five-Decade Role in Singapore Cabinet After Poll 
Setback,” May 15, 2011, available at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-05-15/singapore-
ruling-party-seeks-to-renew-image-with-lee-kuan-yew-resignation.html. See note --- below (on 
the creation of the post of “Minister Mentor”). Goh Chok Tong was the nation’s second Prime 
Minister. 
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from Malaysia in 1965,3 had suffered a huge electoral defeat, while other members of the PAP 
said that the party would have to “change the way it governs” and engage in some “soul-
searching.”4 
 The defeat? The PAP won just over 60% over the votes, and 81 out of the 87 seats in 
Parliament filled by election.5 Anywhere else achieving those results in a reasonably free and 
fair election, as Singapore’s was,6 would be described as a landslide, not a defeat. The PAP’s 
domination of Singapore politics and policy-making for nearly a half-century, through 
reasonably free and fair elections in a society without gross examples of violent repression of 
opposition, may be unique. In this Article I use Singapore’s experience to explore the possibility 
that it exemplifies an as-yet underexamined form of constitutionalism, which I label 
“authoritarian constitutionalism.”7 
                                                 
3 The PAP had been the dominant party in Singapore since it became fully self-governing in 
1959. In 1963 Singapore joined with other Southeast Asian entities to form the Federation of 
Malaysia, which expelled Singapore from the Federation in 1965. 
4 Quoted in Adam, supra note ---. 
5 For discussion of the ways in which additional seats are filled by appointment, see text 
accompanying notes --- infra. 
6 Obviously, any electoral system that translates 60% of the vote into 93% of the seats is highly 
gerrymandered. For a discussion of Singapore’s electoral arrangements, see --- below. 
7 Examples of authoritarianism are ready at hand, those of authoritarian constitutionalism harder 
to come by. Candidates include Malaysia, Mexico before 2000, and Egypt under Mubarak. 
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Legal scholars and political theorists interested in constitutionalism as a normative 
concept tend to dichotomize the subject. There is liberal constitutionalism of the sort familiar in 
                                                                                                                                                             
Somewhat weaker candidates, because their authoritarianism was stronger, are Taiwan between 
roughly 1955 and the late 1980s and South Korea for most of the period between 1948 and 1987. 
Consider this description of Mexico, written in 1991: “Mexico has had a pragmatic and 
moderate authoritarian regime …; an inclusionary system, given to co-optation and incorporation 
rather than exclusion or annihilation; an institutional system, not a personalistic instrument; and a 
civilian leadership, not a military government.” Smith, “Mexico Since 1946,” in 7 CAMBRIDGE 
HISTORY OF LATIN AMERICA 83, 93 (1990). The difficulty with using the latter two nations as 
examples of authoritarian constitutionalism is that the termination of authoritarian rule casts a 
shadow backwards over our understanding of its operation during its long period of stability. See 
also text accompanying notes --- below (discussing the literature on the role of constitutional 
courts when elites believe that the termination of authoritarian rule is likely to occur relatively 
soon). Note, though, that the Mexican system lasted for more than a half century, as has the 
Singaporean one. That seems to me long enough to place the systems in a category worth 
studying. The French Fourth Republic lasted just over a dozen years. (That Singapore may be sui 
generis is suggested by the fact that Lee Kuan Yew remains the dominant figure in Singapore 
politics; the regime has not yet had to face a serious question of leadership succession, although 
the PAP’s leaders have been grappling with the issue of second- and third-generation leadership 
for decades. For a summary of efforts to develop a successor generation of leaders, see MICHAEL 
D. BARR & ZLATKO SKRBIS. CONSTRUCTIING SINGAPORE: ELITISM, ETHNICITY AND THE NATION-
BUILDING PROJECT 66-67 (2008).) 
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the modern West, with core commitments to human rights and self-governance implemented by 
means of varying institutional devices, and there is authoritarianism, rejecting human rights 
entirely and governed by unconstrained power-holders. Charles McIlwain’s often-quoted words 
exemplify the dichotomization: “[C]onstitutionalism has one essential quality; it is a legal 
limitation on government; it is the antithesis of arbitrary rule; its opposite is despotic 
government, the government of will instead of law,” and “[a]ll constitutional government is by 
definition limited government.”8 
This Article explores the possibility, perhaps implicit in a restrained understanding of 
McIlwain’s formulation, of forms of constitutionalism other than liberal constitutionalism.9 The 
Article focuses on what I call authoritarian constitutionalism.10 That discussion is connected to 
                                                 
8 CHARLES MCILWAIN, CONSTITUTIONALISM: ANCIENT AND MODERN 20, 21 (1947). 
9 Cf. James D. Fearon & David D. Laitin, Explaining Interethnic Cooperation, 90 AM. POL. SCI. 
REV. 715, 717 (1996) (suggesting that political scientists have more robust accounts of 
“occasional outbreaks of ethnic violence” than of “the much more common outcome of ethnic 
tensions that do not lead to sustained intergroup violence.”) Similarly, constitutional scholars 
have well-developed substantive and descriptive theories of liberal constitutionalism and 
authoritarianism, but only sketches of such theories of intermediate cases such as authoritarian 
constitutionalism. 
10 For other recent uses of the term, see Alexander Somek, “Authoritarian Constitutionalism: 
Austrain Constitutional Doctrine 1933 to 1938 and Its Legacy,” in DARKER LEGACIES OF LAW IN 
EUROPE: THE SHADOW OF NATIONAL SOCIALISM AND FASCISM OVER EUROPE AND ITS LEGAL 
TRADITIONS 362, 363 (Christian Joerges & Navraj Singh Ghaleigh eds., 2003) (characterizing 
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recent literature in political science on hybrid regimes.11 Drawing on these literatures, this 
Article outlines some characteristics of authoritarian constitutionalism understood normatively.12 
                                                                                                                                                             
authoritarian constitutionalism as “accept[ing] structures of governance that contain most of the 
features of constitutional democracy with the noteworthy exception of (parliamentary) 
democracy itself”); Turkuler Isiksel, Betweern Text and Context: Turkey’s Traditiona of 
Authoritarian Constitutionalism, ---  INT’L J. CONST’L L. ---, --- [manuscript at 9] (2013) 
(defining authoritarian constitutionalism as “tak[ing] the form of meticulous adherence to a 
constitution whose terms directly and unequivocally subordinate the liberties of citizens to an 
oppressive conception of public order and security.”). As will become clear, my definition is 
different from these. 
11 These have been given various names: electoral authoritarianism (ELECTORAL 
AUTHORITARIANISM: THE DYNAMICS OF UNFREE COMPETITION (Andreas Schedler, ed., 2006)); 
competitive authoritarianism (STEVEN LEVITSKY & LUCAN A. WAY, COMPETITIVE 
AUTHORITARIANISM: HYBRID REGIMES AFTER THE COLD WAR (2010)); and semi-
authoritarianism (Martha Brill Olcott & Marina Ottoway, “Challenge of Semi-Authoritarianism,” 
Carnegie Paper No. 7, Oct. 1999, available at 
http://www.policyarchive.org/handle/10207/bitstreams/6578.pdf). The literature in political 
science is more concerned with the conditions for the emergence and stability of hybrid regimes 
than with normative issues, but some parts of the literature shed light on normative issues, as 
does the related literature on the functions of constitutions and courts in truly authoritarian 
regimes. For a discussion of the latter, see text accompanying notes --- infra. The political 
science literature developed in part because political scientists found that describing the 
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The reason for such an exploration parallels that for the analysis of hybrid regimes. For a 
period those regimes were described as transitional, on the assumption that they were an 
intermediate point on a trajectory from authoritarianism to liberal democracy.13 Scholars have 
come to understand that we are better off seeing these regimes as a distinct type (or as several 
distinct types), as stable as many democracies. In short, they have pluralized the category of 
                                                                                                                                                             
intermediate regime-forms as transitional from authoritarian to liberal democracy seemed 
empirically inaccurate. For such an observation about Singapore, see FAREED ZAKARIA, THE 
FUTURE OF FREEDOM: ILLIBERAL DEMOCRACY AT HOME AND ABROAD 86 (2003) (describing 
Singapore’s regime as “an … exception to the rule [of transition to liberal democracy] and one 
that will not last.”). 
12 This paper is an exploration of a conceptual possibility that has some connection to empirical 
reality, but I do not claim that any existing system fits my concept of “authoritarian 
constitutionalism” precisely. For similar explorations, see Baogang He & Mark E. Warren, 
Authoritarian Deliberation: The Deliberative Turn in Chinese Political Development, 9 
PERSPECTIVES ON POLITICS 269 (2011); JOHN RAWLS, THE LAW OF PEOPLES (1999) (discussing 
the conceptual possibility of a “decent hierarchical society”). 
13 See Levitsky & Way, supra note ---, at 3-4 (referring to a “democratizing bias” and the 
“assumption that hybrid regimes are … moving in a democratic direction” in the relevant 
literature). 
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regime types.14 Similarly, I suggest, pluralizing the category of constitutionalism will enhance 
understanding by allowing us to draw distinctions between regimes that should be normatively 
distinguished. Consider one “list of  … electoral authoritarian regimes (as of 2006) …[:] 
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Tajikistan; … Algeria, Egypt, 
Tunisia, and Yemen; … Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Guinea, 
Mauritania, Tanzania, Togo, and Zambia; … Cambodia, Malaysia, and Singapore.”15 Whatever 
the utility for political scientists of treating these nations as a single group, for a normative 
constitutionalist there are obvious distinctions to be drawn: From a constitutionalist’s point of 
view, even as of 2006 Russia was different from Singapore and Malaysia, and China different 
from Singapore. Describing a category of authoritarian constitutionalism – and, more generally, 
pluralizing our understanding of constitutionalism – may contribute to analytic clarity in law as it 
did in political science.16 
                                                 
14 For a description of the need to pluralize specific to Singapore and Malaysia, see Diane K. 
Mauzy, The Challenge to Democracy: Singapore’s and Malaysia’s Resilient Hybrid Regimes, 2 
TAIWAN J. DEMOCRACY 47, 51-52 (2006). 
15 Andreas Schedler, “The Logic of Electoral Authoritarianism,” in Schedler, supra note ---, at 3. 
See also JENNIFER GANDHI, POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS UNDER DICTATORSHIP 14-15 (2008) 
(including China and Singapore as dictatorships). 
16 Some hints of pluralization crop up in discussions of “shortfalls” from full constitutionalism in 
basically constitutionalist nations and of the distinction between constitutions that are “shams” 
and those that, while not fully realized in practice, are “aspirational.” See, e.g., David S. Law & 
Mila Versteeg, Sham Constitutions, 101 CAL. L. REV. 863, 880 (2013) (observing that “[it] can be 
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I begin here with a brief description of three forms of constitutionalism other than liberal 
constitutionalism.17  In absolutist constitutionalism, a single decision-maker motivated by an 
interest in the nation’s well-being consults widely and protects civil liberties generally, but in the 
end decides on a course of action in the decision-maker’s sole discretion, unchecked by any other 
institutions. In mere rule-of-law constitutionalism, the decision-maker conforms with some 
general procedural requirements and implements decisions through, among other things, 
independent courts, but is not constrained by any substantive rules regarding, for example, civil 
liberties. Finally, in authoritarian constitutionalism liberal freedoms are protected at an 
intermediate level and elections are reasonably free and fair. 
The Table below summarizes the preceding discussion and indicates why authoritarian 
constitutionalism might be distinctive. The Article proceeds by describing in Part II Singapore’s 
constitutionalism, to motivate the later consideration of a more generalized account of 
authoritarian constitutionalism. Beginning the effort to pluralize the idea of constitutionalism, 
Part III examines the role of constitutions and courts in absolutist nations and in nations with 
mere rule-of-law constitutionalism. Part IV is deflationary, arguing against some political 
scientists’ instrumental or strategic accounts of constitutions, courts, and elections in nations 
with fully authoritarian systems, where liberal freedoms are not generally respected. The Part 
implicitly suggests that whatever semblance of true constitutionalism there is in such nations 
results from normative commitments by authoritarian rulers. Part V lays out some general 
                                                                                                                                                             
difficult … to distinguish empirically between aspirational constitutions … and sham 
constitutions….”). 
17 The descriptions are elaborated in somewhat more detail in the succeeding Parts of the Article. 
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characteristics of authoritarian constitutionalism, again with the goal of suggesting that 
authoritarian constitutionalism may best be defined by attributing moderately strong normative 
commitments to constitutionalism – not strategic calculations – to those controlling these 
nations. The upshot of Parts III through V is that either (a) the commitment to constitutionalism 
in all authoritarian regimes is a sham, or (b) at least some of them – the ones I label 
“authoritarian constitutionalist” – might have a normative commitment to constitutionalism. Part 
VI concludes with the suggestion that authoritarian constitutionalism has some normative 
attractions, at least in nations where the alternative of authoritarianism is more likely than that of 
liberal democracy. 
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II. Constitutionalism (?) in Singapore 
 Understanding the nature of Singapore’s authoritarian constitutionalism can provide the 
foundation for understanding authoritarian constitutional more generally. In this Part I offer an 
overview of some important features of Singapore’s legal system and their effects. The topics 
range from surveillance of private life to electoral manipulation. In each area, I argue, 
Singapore’s legal system is clearly not that of a liberal democracy, but neither is it fully 
authoritarian. At the least, there are interstices tolerated by the regime in which standard liberal 
freedoms, including freedom to dissent from existing policy, can be found. Cumulatively, I 
   Level of force and 
fraud in elections (or 
no elections) 
  
  Low Intermediate High No elections 
 Low Illiberal 
democracy or 
mere rule of law 
constitutionalism 
Semiauthoritarianism Authoritar 
ianism 
Authoritar-
ianism 
Liberal 
freedoms 
Intermediate Authoritarian 
constitutionalism 
[? Authoritarian 
constitutionalism] 
 Mere rule of law 
constitutional-
ism 
 High Liberal democracy   Idealized 
absolutist 
monarchy 
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believe, these features show that Singapore’s regime appears to adhere to some version of 
normative constitutionalism. 
 
A. A Brief Account of Singapore’s Constitutional History 
 Singapore was a British colony from the nineteenth century through the mid-twentieth.18 
After a brutal occupation by Japanese armed forces during World War II and in conjunction with 
worldwide trends of decolonization, Singapore gained increasing internal self-government 
through the 1950s. Full self-government arrived in 1963, when, led by Lee Kuan Yew and the 
PAP, Singapore signed an agreement with Malaya and several formerly British territories in 
Borneo to create the federation of Malaysia. Ethnic tensions strained the federation almost 
immediately, with Singapore’s Chinese population believing that the federation’s policies 
unfairly favored people of Malay origin, and Malays in Singapore outraged at PAP policies. 
These tensions were exacerbated by Indonesian military activity, and led to ethnic riots in 
Singapore. Malaysia expelled Singapore from the federation in 1965,19 and Singapore became an 
independent nation. 
                                                 
18 This summary draws upon A HISTORY OF SINGAPORE (Ernest C.T. Chew & Edwin Lee eds., 
1991), especially Yeo Kim Wah & Albert Lau, “From Colonialism to Independence, 1945-
1965,” in id., at 117. 
19 Lee Kuan Yew called the expulsion “a moment of anguish,” contradicting his lifelong hope for 
merger with Malaya. See EDWIN LEE, SINGAPORE: THE UNEXPECTED NATION 598 (2008) 
(quoting Lee Kuan Yew).  
12 
 
 With this as background, I now provide a description of some key aspects of the general 
system of civil liberties and elections in Singapore over the last half century. 
 
B. Chewing Gum and Caning 
 Mention Singapore to a reasonably informed audience and some of the first things one 
hears deal with chewing gum and caning. Chewing gum, it is said, is banned in Singapore, and 
caning symbolizes the regime’s harsh treatment of minor offenses. 
 As it happens, chewing gum is no longer banned, as a result of the free trade agreement 
that Singapore has with the United States.20 The caning story is more interesting. Caning 
attracted attention in the United States when a U.S. citizen was sentenced to be caned for 
vandalizing several cars as a teenage prank.21 Caning as a punishment for vandalism was 
instituted in 1966, when political protestors threatened to place “Yankee Go Home” posters on 
                                                 
20 The United States insisted that imports of chewing gum be allowed. The compromise position 
was to make chewing gum available for medicinal uses; I have been unable to determine how 
readily it is actually available. One local informant conveyed his impression that chewing gum is 
generally available in pharmacies and supermarkets as long as it contains some ingredients 
plausibly describable as having medicinal properties. 
21 See Li-Ann Thio, “Taking Human Rights Seriously? Human Rights Law in Singapore,” in 
HUMAN RIGHTS IN ASIA: A COMPARATIVE LEGAL STUDY OF TWELVE ASIAN JURISDICTIONS, 
FRANCE AND THE USA 158, 163 (Randall Peerenboom et al., eds. 2006) (describing the incident). 
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the walls of private businesses as part of their activities against the War in Vietnam.22 The 
punishment remained available for ordinary acts of vandalism.23  
 Chewing gum and caning are metaphors that capture a widespread sense that Singapore is 
a state in which the government intrudes deeply into private life.24 Whether Singapore is more of 
a “surveillance state” than other modern regimes is, I think, open to question. The regime has 
conducted overt surveillance of public political protests,25 and the Prime Minister once 
                                                 
22 The background is described in JOTHIE RAJAH, AUTHORITARIAN RULE OF LAW: LEGISLATION, 
DISCOURSE AND LEGITIMACY IN SINGAPORE 71-72 (2012). According to Rajah, the threat was 
unsuccessful. Id. at 71-72. 
23 It is worth observing that bill-posting on private property without the owner’s consent is 
generally unlawful in the United States and Great Britain, as the ubiquitous sign in London, “Bill 
Posters Will Be Prosecuted,” indicates. Citation.  
24 See Li-Ann Thio, Lex Rex or Rex Lex?: Competing Conceptions of the Rule of Law in 
Singapore, 20 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 1, 36 (2002) (referring to “government attempts to 
influence behaviour in the most intimate affairs,” including “public campaigns to flush toilets”). 
I note that such campaigns are primarily government speech, though presumably backed up by 
the possibility of some sort of sanction in egregious cases. 
25 On some occasions the protesters have responded to government videotaping of their activities 
by videotaping the officers conducting the surveillance. See CHERIAN GEORGE, CONTENTIOUS 
JOURNALISM AND THE INTERNET: TOWARDS DEMOCRATIC DISCOURSE IN MALAYSIA AND 
SINGAPORE 128 (2006) (describing government cameras at public rallies). Cf. Laird v. Tatum, 
14 
 
responded to a question about how he knew with some precision what had been said at a private 
meeting of an opposition group, “In the age of the tape recorder, you want to know how I am 
able to get a transcript of what you said?” (to which the questioner asked, “But how did the tape 
recorder get into the … room?”).26 Visitors to Singapore regularly comment on the absence of a 
visible police presence in the city. “Visible” is the operative word, because there may be large 
numbers of undercover police agents deployed in the ordinary course. And, perhaps more 
important, it might be that Singapore’s regulation of life is so pervasive that its residents have 
fully internalized the norms the regime wishes to advance, which would reduce the need for a 
visible police presence. 
 All that said, Singapore seems far from full authoritarianism in the degree to which the 
regime penetrates ordinary life.  
 
C. Freedom of Expression 
 (1) A Survey of Singapore’s Regulation of Expression. 
(a) The Internal Security Act. Singapore has an Internal Security Act (ISA) that 
authorizes detention without trial of those thought to pose a threat to national security.27 It has 
                                                                                                                                                             
408 U.S. 1 (1972) (holding nonjusticiable a challenge to U.S. government surveillance of public 
demonstrations). 
26 RAJAH, supra note ---, at 205-06. 
27 Internal Security Act, Cap. 143, 1985 Rev. Ed. Sing. 
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been used in Singapore on three notable occasions.28 Two involved threats that reasonably, 
though not inevitably, could be regarded as serious enough to justify the invocation of 
emergency powers.29 The third involved a clear exaggeration by the government of the threat 
posed by efforts by Roman Catholic social workers inspired by liberation theology to organize 
Singapore’s poor.30 The use of the ISA in response to what government officials called the 
                                                 
28 The ISA has been invoked sporadically in individual cases, but the three incidents described in 
the text are those regularly dealt with in discussions of constitutionalism in Singapore. 
29 One episode occurred before Singapore became independent, but is generally regarded as part 
of the relevant history of the Internal Security Act’s use. In the run-up to the creation of the 
Federation of Malaysia, security forces detained leaders of a major opposition group, known as 
Barisan Sosialis, which opposed the merger and was an ally of communist-led insurgent forces 
operating in Malaya. Citation. The ISA’s invocation was authorized by the Internal Security 
Council, which had on it representatives of Singapore, Great Britain, and the Federation of 
Malaya. CHRIS LYDGATE, LEE’S LAW: HOW SINGAPORE CRUSHES DISSENT 40 (2003). In 2001 
and 2002 the Internal Security Act was used to detain members of Jemaah Islamiah, a group 
affiliated with al-Qaeda. For a discussion, see Michael Hor, “Singapore’s Anti-Terrorism Laws: 
Reality and Substance,” in VICTOR RAMRAJ ET AL. EDS., GLOBAL ANTI-TERRORISM LAW AND 
POLICY 271, 278-80 (2d ed. 2012). 
30 For a description of the events, see Jack Tsen-Ta Lee, Shall the Twain Never Meet? Competing 
Narratives and Discourses of the Rule of Law in Singapore, 2012 SINGAPORE J. LEGAL STUD. 
298, 307-08. 
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“Marxist Plot” looms large in the current memory of today’s dissidents and those who might join 
them.31 
The ISA is the classic sword of Damocles, which is effective in deterring dissent even 
when it merely hangs suspended over their heads. And, perhaps unlike similar emergency laws in 
fully constitutionalist legal orders, the fact that the ISA was invoked abusively in 1987 suggests 
that the thread holding it in suspense might be cut again. Yet, Singapore’s track record of abusive 
invocations of emergency powers may still be comparable to the track record in those other 
orders: No more than one abuse in twenty-five or more years is not a terrible record among fully 
constitutionalist regimes. 
(b) Sedition laws. Singapore inherited a British-style sedition law authorizing criminal 
punishment for criticizing government policies,32 on the ground that such criticism might foment 
discontent with those policies and ultimately produce social disorder through law-breaking. 
Singaporean authorities chose to use other methods of pursuing their critics, though, and the 
sedition laws have been largely unused. Over the past decade a handful of sedition charges have 
been brought, based on the view that strong expressions of disagreement with various religious 
views poses the kind of threat of social disorder – here, of violent communal conflict – to which 
                                                 
31 See Andrew Jacobs, “As Singapore Loosens Its Grip, Residents Lose Fear to Challenge 
Authority,” New York Times, June 18, 2012, p. A-11 (quoting a Singaporean activist, “It cast 
such a large shadow that people here still feel constrained about speaking up.”). 
32 Cap. 233, 1985 Rev. Ed. Sing., §§ 3(1)(e), 4. 
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classic sedition laws are directed.33 The expression targeted by these prosecutions might well 
have been denominated hate speech in jurisdictions with bans on such speech.  
(c) Libel law.34 Singaporean authorities have not needed to use criminal sedition law 
against the regime’s critics, because individual officials have been able to use individual-level 
libel laws to obtain substantial monetary damage awards from those critics. Damage liability is 
particularly effective because of its interaction with Singapore’s electoral rules, which make 
people with undischarged bankruptcies ineligible for public office.35  
                                                 
33 See Tania Ng Tze Lin, The Rule of Law in Managing God: Multi-Religiosity in Singapore, 3 
ASIAN J. PUBLIC AFF. 92, 97 (----) (describing the first post-independence sedition prosecution in 
2005 brought against “three bloggers [who] made defamatory remarks against the Malay-Muslim 
community,” and another in 2009 against “a Christian couple … for distributing seditious 
publications that denigrated the Catholic Church and Islam.”). For a vigorous criticism of the 
latter prosecution as unjustified under the Sedition Act’s terms, see Yock Lin Tan, Sedition and 
Its New Clothes in Singapore, 2011 SINGAPORE J. LEGAL STUD. 212. Tan discusses the 
relationship between the Sedition Act and hate-speech regulations, id. at 235-36. 
34 For overviews of Singapore libel law, see Lee, supra note ---, at 313-18; Cameron Sim, The 
Singapore Chill: Political Defamation and the Normalization of a Statist Rule of Law, 20  PAC. 
RIM L. & POL’Y J. 319, 331-45 (2011). 
35 Const. Singapore, art. 45(1)(b). Such a disqualification is not uncommon around the world. It 
rests on the judgment, sensible in the abstract, that an official laboring subject to a continuing 
obligation to pay his/her creditors might be tempted to use public office for private gain 
(personal gain in the first instance, but of course with the gain to be transferred to the creditors). 
18 
 
The form of Singapore’s libel law is rather traditional, and has not been substantially 
modified to take concerns about free expression into more account than the classic common law 
did. With respect to public officials, Singapore’s High Court expressly rejected modifications of 
the sort imposed by New York Times v. Sullivan and its analogues in other common law 
systems.36 Its reasons were traditional ones, with a modest adaptation to what it thought were 
Singapore’s special circumstances: False statements about public officials undermine public 
confidence in their conduct and thereby impair the government’s effectiveness. Specifically, 
according to the court, Singapore’s success, both economically and in stabilizing a multicultural 
                                                                                                                                                             
See Thio, supra note ---, at 19-20 (reporting a finding “that between 1971-1993, ‘there had been 
11 cases of opposition politicians who had been made bankrupt after being sued.’”). See also 
LYDGATE, supra note ---, at 260 (providing a descriptive compilation of libel suits brought by 
government officials). 
36 J.B. Jeyaretnam v. Lee Kuan Yew, (1992) 2 SLR 310. The defendant, known in Singapore as 
JBJ, was until his death in 2008 the leading figure in Singapore’s opposition. See Seth Mydans, 
“J.B. Jeyaretnam, Persistent Opposition Figure in Singapore, Is Dead at 82,” New York Times, 
Oct. 3, 2008, p. 43. Li-Ann Thio, Between Apology and Apogee: Autochthony: The “Rule of 
Law” Beyond the Rules of Law in Singapore, 2012 SINGAPORE J. LEGAL STUD. 269, 290-92, finds 
some intimations in relatively recent decisions of the possibility that Singapore’s courts will 
move closer to the position on libel held in other common-law jurisdictions, though not as far as 
New York Times v. Sullivan. 
19 
 
society, rests on stringent policies against corruption, known by all to be vigorously enforced.37 
False imputations of corruption are especially damaging in Singapore because “the best people 
must be attracted to serve the Singaporean leadership without fear of damage to their 
reputations.”38 And, Singapore’s courts are relatively generous in describing statements about a 
public official’s conduct as imputing corruption to the official as sufficient to warrant a judgment 
on the merits of both the interpretation and the determination of the statements’ falsity or 
accuracy. 
The courts’ emphasis on the special harm that false imputations of corruption does in 
Singapore explains what might be Singaporean libel law’s largest deviation from traditional 
common law rules: It is appropriate that damage awards be larger when the target of the false 
statement is a high public official, because the damage to reputation and to Singaporean stability 
is larger.39 As one judge put it, “The greater the reputation of the person defamed, the greater the 
                                                 
37 For a good summary of this position, see Thio, supra note ---, at 276. For a discussion of why I 
attempt to present reasonably sympathetic accounts of the reasons offered for this and other 
aspects of Singaporean law, see text accompanying note --- infra. 
38 Sim, supra note ---, at 329. 
39 The thought is akin to the traditional idea that “the greater the truth, the greater the libel.” See, 
e.g., Bustos v. A&E TV Networks, 646 F.3d 762, 763 (10th Cir. 2011). The traditional idea, 
though, referred to the content of the libelous statement, not the statement’s target. Still, the 
analogy might be sufficient to justify the Singaporean rule as a matter of common law reasoning. 
20 
 
damage award that will be made – on the basis that these persons are vulnerable in so far as they 
are well known … and have a wider circle of social and business contacts.”40 
(d) Judicial independence. In 1986 a senior trial judge was transferred to the attorney 
general’s office after he ruled in Jeyaretnam’s favor in a politically charged case. The action was 
authorized by law, but was unusual because of the judge’s seniority. Government critics asserted 
that the transfer was a form of punishment inflicted on a sitting judge, and an indication of the 
judiciary’s lack of independence from the government.41 Christopher Lingle, an academic, faced 
a defamation suit for writing that an unnamed country – clearly Singapore – had “a “compliant 
judiciary [that was used] to bankrupt opposition politicians….”42 A 1990 report by a committee 
of the New York City Bar Association said that Singapore’s judges were “kept on a very short 
leash.”43 
These incidents and judgments, though not recent, seem to continue to be apt. 
Singapore’s courts regularly uphold government actions that a more independent judiciary might 
question, and in the one notable incident of judicial resistance to a government action the 
underlying legislation was immediately modified and the courts deprived of jurisdiction.44 Of 
                                                 
40 Lee Kuan Yew v. Vinocur & Others, 3 Sing. L. Rep. 477, 485-86 (1995). 
41 See, e.g., . Frank et al., DECLINE IN THE RULE OF LAW IN SINGAPORE AND MALAYSIA 95-96 
(1990); Francis T. Seow, “The Politics of Judicial Institutions in Singapore,” available at 
http://www.singapore-window.org/1028judi.htm. (The cited text was a lecture given in 1997.) 
42 citation 
43 Frank et al., note --- supra, at 92. 
44 See TAN --- infra for a discussion of the episode. 
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course, judicial deference to the government is common in nations where one political party 
dominates the system for an extended period, for obvious structural reasons.45 Yet, even among 
such judiciaries Singapore’s seems more defrerential than others, for example, in forgoing 
opportunities for subconstitutional review or rights-protective interpretations of statutes.46 
(e)“Out of bounds” markers and the regulation of public space. Singapore has an 
extensive system of regulations dealing with uses of public spaces – streets and parks, in the 
classic formulation – for political purposes. The Public Order Act of 2009 requires that a 
permit be obtained for a demonstration by even a single person, and other regulations 
apply to gatherings of more than a handful of people.47 Permits must be obtained from a 
relatively large number of authorities. The very number of permits required for a single 
demonstration deters under-resourced groups from applying. Even more, the grounds for denial 
are unclear. 
                                                 
45 The party’s control of the government coupled with even modest mechanisms for making 
judges accountable to the government – through appointment mechanisms, for example – means 
that eventually the judiciary will consist entirely of judges who owe their jobs to the dominant 
party. 
46 The Japanese Supreme Court is offered as an example of a court in a dominant-party system 
that is, for that reason, “conservative” in its treatment of government initiatives. Yet, it has 
engaged in a non-trivial amount of subconstitutional review and rights-protective statutory 
interpretation. For a discussion, see Frank K. Upham, Stealth Activism: Norm Formation by 
Japanese Courts, 88 WASH. U.L. REV. 1493 (2011). 
47 Public Order (Preservation) Act (No. 15 of 2009). 
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An incident in 1994 set the terms for discussions of the availability of public space for 
political purposes. Catherine Lim, a popular novelist, made some mildly critical comments about 
Singapore’s government.48 Government officials responded with what Singaporean activists 
have characterized  – and assimilated into their thinking – as an intense attack upon Lim.49 The 
officials mounted a verbal campaign against Lim and criticized her for capitalizing on her 
celebrity as a novelist to engage in political commentary: “[I]f you are outside the political arena 
and influence opinion, and if people believe that your policies are right, when we know they are 
wrong, you are not there to account for the policy.”50 The newspaper that had published her 
                                                 
48 For details of the incident, see Terence Lee, The Politics of Civil Society in Singapore, 26 
ASIAN STUDIES REV. 98, 109-10 (2002). The tenor of Lim’s statement is captured in this: 
“Increasingly, the promised … style of people-orientation is being subsumed under the old style 
of top-down decisions.” CATHERINE LIM, A WATERSHED ELECTION: SINGAPORE’S GE 2011,  at 
127-39 (2011) (reprinting her 1993 essay). 
49 See FRANCIS T. SEOW, THE MEDIA ENTHRALLED: SINGAPORE REVISITED 27-28 (1998) 
(describing the government’s response as “a blistering open letter”). On the assimilation of the 
threat, see Lenor Lyons, “Internalized Boundaries: AWARE’s Place in Singapore’s Emerging 
Civil Society, in PATHS NOT TAKEN: POLITICAL PLURALISM IN POST-WAR SINGAPORE 248, 255 
(Michael D. Barr & Carl A. Trocki eds.).  
50 Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong, quoted in LIM, supra note ---, at ---. 
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column dropped her as a commentator, and she was unable to find another outlet.51 As 
government officials put it, Lim had gone out of bounds. 
The term “out of bounds” entered Singaporean regulatory discourse. Importantly, while 
government officials acknowledged that there were “out of bounds markers,” they refused to 
specify before the event where those markers were, although “race” and “religion” do appear to 
be out of bounds. Protestors engaged in their activities at  the peril of later being told that they 
had strayed out of bounds.52 
These techniques obviously restricted political uses of public spaces. Yet, a striking 
feature of some accounts of the problem with unspecified out of bounds markers is this: Activists 
recount episodes in which, before the event, they feared that they would be unable to navigate 
through the regulatory process to obtain permits, and then express surprise that they were in fact 
able to do so.53 Activists also developed methods of evading the regulatory system. For example, 
                                                 
51 SEOW, supra note ---, at 28. Lim continued to publish novels and political commentary. For a 
recent work of commentary, see LIM, supra note ---. 
52 Even the clarity of the boundaries with respect to race and religion might be illusory in a polity 
where many issues are tightly bound up with the politics of race and religion. Consider, for 
example, criticism of some resource allocation decision made on the nominal basis of geography 
but with an evident racially disparate impact. 
53 See, e.g., GEORGE, supra note ---, at 127, 137 (describing a “Save JBJ” rally held after getting 
permits from the police, the Building and Construction Authority [to hang banners from 
building], and the Public Health Commission [to sell books and stickers], and asserting that the 
organizers were as “surprised as anyone when their Save JBJ rally cleared one regulatory hurdle 
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at one point the government lifted all restrictions on “indoor public talks” by Singaporeans, and 
did not restrict efforts by non-Singaporeans to promote and discuss books they had written. 
Activists responded by convening meetings of “book clubs,” nominally to discuss works 
written by non-Singaporeans but of course providing the occasion for discussing the 
authors’ views as well as their books.54 
The government responded to concerns about the severity of its restrictions on the 
political uses of public space by adopting what it called an experiment in limited deregulation.55 
It designated a section of a reasonably centrally located public park as a space in which political 
speeches could be conducted without prior permission, on the model, it said, of London’s Hyde 
Park Corner.56 The experiment succeeded, at least in the sense that for a while it elicited political 
activity at the designated space. But, probably consistent with general experience with such 
venues, the excitement wore off, the use of the space became routine, listeners came to be 
                                                                                                                                                             
after another and actually materialized.”) [RA to recheck source]; Lydgate, supra note ---, at 
285-87 (describing the process of organizing the “Save JBJ” rally); Alvin Tan, “Theatre and 
Cultures: Globalizing Strategies,” in RENAISSANCE SINGAPORE?: ECONOMY, CULTURE, AND 
POLITICS 188-90 (Kenneth Paul Tan ed. 2007) (describing how theater companies “overc[ame] 
censorship limitations”). 
54 See Lynette Chua, Pragmatic Resistance, Law, and Social Movements in Authoritarian States: 
The Case of Gay Collective Action in Singapore, 46 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 713, 734 (2012)  
55 For the details, see ---. 
56 For a critical description of the Speakers’ Corner initiative as “gestural politics,” see Lee, 
supra note ---, at 110-11. 
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curiosity-seekers rather than political dissidents, and the use diminished, with a revival in usage 
after the 2011 elections.57 
(f) Press regulation. Regulation of the traditional press and media in Singapore takes two 
forms. Traditional media based outside of Singapore such as the Asian Wall Street Journal must 
obtain permits to circulate within the nation.58 Pursuant to a statute authorizing restrictions on 
distribution of foreign publications that “engag[e] in the domestic politics of Singapore,”59 the 
government threatens to suspend permits or limit circulation when these newspapers publish 
material that the government believes casts government policy in a false and disparaging light. 
Sometimes the threats allow limited circulation, but without advertising, which of course makes 
publication unprofitable. Yet, the most celebrated examples of government threats seem 
relatively mild. They consist of permit suspension unless the newspaper agrees to publish an 
                                                 
57 According to one report, within three months of Speakers’ Corner’s opening, “The novelty … 
was fast fading, with few regular speakers and a sparse, uninterested crowd of listeners.” Quoted 
in Lee, supra note ---, at 111. But see Jacobs, supra note --- (describing recent uses of public 
spaces other than Speakers’ Corner). RA to get additional citations on Pink Dot 
demonstrations. 
58 For overviews of the regulation of international media, see GARY RODAN, TRANSPARENCY AND 
AUTHORITARIAN RULE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA 27-34 (2004); SEOW, supra note ---, at 140-74. 
59 Quoted in SEOW, supra note ---, at 148. 
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unedited version of a government response to the statements to which the government takes 
exception.60  
The regulation of large, general circulation newspapers in Singapore occurs through 
indirect government influence over the newspapers’ board of directors. Singapore law requires 
that these newspapers divide their shares into two classes, ordinary shares and management 
shares. Management shares are weighted at 200 times those of ordinary shares, and are held by 
directors whose appointment must be approved by the government. According to Cherian 
George, “Virtually all daily titles … are published by Singapore Press Holdings,” whose 
management and board “has been headed by former senior officials from government” since the 
1980s,61 including one chief executive officer who had been the head of the internal security 
                                                 
60 SEOW, supra note ---, at 148-49, describes circulation restrictions placed on Time magazine – 
reducing it from 18,000 to 9,000 to 2,000 copies a week – until the magazine agreed to publish 
an unedited response.  
61 GEORGE, supra note ---, at 48, 49. I think it worth noting that in 2013 George was denied 
tenure in the School of Communication and Information of Nanyang Technological University, a 
private university in Singapore. Critics of the decision suggested that the denial occurred because 
of George’s controversial role in commentary on Singaporean politics. See “Singaporean 
Scholars Raise Concerns About Controversial Tenure Denial,” Inside Higher Ed, May 2, 2013, 
available at http://www.insidehighered.com/quicktakes/2013/05/02/singaporean-scholars-raise-
concerns-about-controversial-tenure-denial.  
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department.62 What George describes as “opposition party newsletters” do “continue to 
circulate.63 
Gary Rodan summarizes the regulatory system in these terms: “The emphasis … is on 
ensuring that the medium does not facilitate political mobilisation…. This mean[s] restricting 
political engagement and competition to within a narrow sphere of party politics….”64  
(g) Internet regulation. Some observers attributed the election results of 2011 to the 
widespread use of social media to communicate discontent with government policies.65 The 
                                                 
62 GARY RODAN, TRANSPARENCY AND AUTHORITARIAN RULE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA 21 (2004). 
63 Cherian George, “History Spiked: Hegemony and the Denial of Media Diversity,” in PATHS 
NOT TAKEN, supra note ---, 264, 276 (emphasis added). The distribution of books is worth 
separate mention. According Rodan, supra note ---, at 91, as of 2004 controversial books were 
rarely to be found on the shelves of bookstores, but were available for special order. A local 
informant states that today, “A number of books on controversial topics can now be purchased 
quite openly from bookshops. Examples include a recent book by opposition politician Chee 
Soon Juan and a number of works by some former ‘Marxist Conspiracy’ ISA detainees who have 
denied they were involved in any plot to overthrow the Government.” See also Hor, supra note --
-, at 276 (observing that such books are “on the shelves” in Singapore). 
64 RODAN, supra note ---, at 107. 
65 See, e.g., LIM, supra note ---, at 5 (listing “the tremendous power of the Internet” among the 
reasons for the election results); Terence Lee, “Mainstream Media Reporting in the Lead-Up to 
GE2011,” in VOTING IN CHANGE: POLITICS OF SINGAPORE’S 2011 GENERAL ELECTION 131, 132 
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government had been concerned about the use of the Internet for many years. In one celebrated 
case it harassed the operator of a website to the point that the site had to close down.66 It blocked 
access to one hundred sites offering pornography “as a symbolic gesture but … declared that it 
would not ban any political site.”67 But, in general the government took what it called a “light 
touch” approach to the Internet, focusing on websites that contained sexual content and “material 
harmful to racial and religious harmony.”68 Cherian George lists some categories of websites 
operating in Singapore as of 2006: opposition parties; sites promoting free speech, “several civil 
society groups,” including those advocating gay rights, religious and linguistic groups “claiming 
fair treatment,” and some international groups such as Falun Gong.69 The government 
commissioned a report on new media, delivered in 2008. With respect to “Online political 
content,” the “overarching intent” behind the Commission’s regulations was “to liberalise 
existing regulations to encourage active, balanced online political discussion while minimising 
the adverse effects that such change could bring.”70 The Commission specifically recommended 
that “individuals …and political parties that provide any programme for the propagation, 
                                                                                                                                                             
(Kvein Y.L. Tan & Terence Lee eds. 2011) (observing that the “new media continued its 
transition from being marginal and alternative to being mainstream.”).. 
66 See GEORGE, supra note ---, ch. 5 (describing the events involving Sintercom). 
67 Id. at 56. 
68 Id. at 72-73. 
69 Id. at 80-81. 
70 Advisory Council on the Impact of New Media on Society, “Engaging New Media, 
Challenging Old Assumptions,” p. 15 (Dec. 2008). 
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promotion or discussion of political or religious issues relating to Singapore” on websites not be 
required to register.71 
In 2013, the government adopted a new policy that would require websites that “report 
regularly on Singapore news and attract at least 50,000 visitors a month” would have to register 
and pay a substantial fee for a license.72 According to reports, the policy would “affect[] 10 Web 
sites, including Yahoo news”;73 the others were reportedly state-owned.74 Whether this is a 
significant expansion of existing regulations remains to be determined. Much will depend on 
definitions and enforcement. For example, fifty thousand visitors worldwide is a tiny number, 
fifty thousand Singaporean ones is not, and “reporting” on news and commenting on Singapore 
politics might be different activities. 
Writing in 2006, Cherian George observed in connection with the new media that “things 
are getting interesting at the margins,” and that it was “quite possible that intelligent, incremental 
changes at the center will succeed in preserving the status quo.”75 That appears to be the 
                                                 
71 Id., p. 16. It also recommended that “the symbolic ban on 100 websites should be lifted …. 
While there is merit in symbolism, it becomes counterproductive when parents are given a false 
sense of security.” Id., p. 22. See also Hor, supra note ---, at 274 (describing the availability on 
web-sites of videos that had been banned in Singapore). 
72 See “Singapore Clamps Down on News Web Sites,” New York Times, June 15, 2013.  
73 Ibid. 
74 See Heather Tan, “Singapore to Require News Websites to be Licensed,” 
http://bigstory.ap.org/article/singapore-news-websites-require-licenses. 
75 GEORGE, supra note ---, at 223, 224. 
30 
 
government’s strategy. Whether it will succeed, or whether the government will conclude that 
stronger regulatory controls are needed, remains to be seen.76 
(2) Freedom of Expression Overall: An Assessment. Singapore is clearly not a civil 
libertarian paradise of free expression. Yet, that is an inappropriate standard for assessing 
whether Singapore’s regulation of free expression conforms to the perhaps modest requirements 
of normative constitutionalism as such constitutionalism is instantiated in nations generally 
regarded as constitutionalist. Each of the regulations Singapore places on freedom expression has 
its counterpart in such nations, with the possible exception of the Singaporean rule that libel 
damages escalate when a high official is the target of false statements.77 And, it seems that none 
of the regulations are enforced with a stringency that their terms appear to license. Such a “slice 
and dice” or disaggregated approach is almost certainly inappropriate as well, perhaps something 
like a fallacy of decomposition.78 The cumulative effect of small regulations might be 
                                                 
76 Cherian George, “Internet Politics: Shouting Down the PAP,” in VOTING IN CHANGE, supra 
note ---, at 145, 149, describes an earlier attempt to regulate web-sites by requiring disclosures 
and limitations on foreign funding that “caused few problems” because the web-site’s operators 
had already decided to operate on a volunteer basis. 
77 Even that rule might be defensible in the way Singapore’s courts have defended it, at least 
within the framework of common-law development of libel law.  
78 Cf. ADRIAN VERMEULE, THE SYSTEM OF THE CONSTITUTION 9 (2011) (describing “the fallacy of 
composition,” which is “to assume that if the components of an aggregate … have a certain 
property, the aggregate … must have the same property.” Here the components lack a property 
but the aggregate might have it. 
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substantial. And, the sword-of-Damocles metaphor, captured in the theory of freedom of 
expression as the “chilling effect” doctrine, explains why the mere existence of regulations with 
a theoretically broad reach can have troubling effects on the actual practices of freedom of 
expression.79 So, for example, a Singaporean informant suggested that the out-of-bounds 
markers have shifted substantially, broadening the domain of permissible dissent. Yet, without 
clarity from the authorities, potential dissidents will necessarily be concerned that some activity 
will fall outside the new markers, or that, provoked by the demonstration, the authorities will 
“shift” the markers in a restrictive direction.80 
 
D. Election Rules 
 Singapore has a one-house legislature. Initially its members were elected from single-
member districts. This posed a risk to the PAP: An opposition party might gain enough support 
in a single district, or in a few, to elect one or more non-PAP members. As PAP leaders 
presented the problem, though, it was as much a question of social order as of political 
domination. The possible “swing” constituencies were ethnically distinctive, and, according to 
                                                 
79 The Singaporean government’s refusal to specify where “out of bounds markers” are set is a 
near-perfect example of the mechanism by which the chilling effect occurs. As Justice Brennan 
put it in an early chilling-effect case, without clarity a person will “steer … wide[] of the 
unlawful zone.” Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958) (holding that the state must bear the 
burden of proof that an applicant for a tax exemption advocated seditious action). 
80 I use scare quotes because one effect of the authorities’ failure to identify the OB markers is 
that no outsider can know before the event where the markers actually are. 
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the PAP, this raised the possibility of ethnically based parties whose programs would disrupt the 
social stability that, PAP leaders asserted, had been so painfully achieved. Such parties, of 
course, would also capitalize on minority resentment at lack of parliamentary representation to 
become strong enough to offer a real challenge to the PAP’s dominance.  
 After J.B. Jeyaretnam won election from a single-member constituency in 1981, the 
government responded by changing the rules.81 It created multi-member constituencies, known 
as “group representation constituencies,” targeting the swing constituencies by including them – 
but not others – in such constituencies.82 Accompanying this change, the government required 
that the slates for multimember constituencies be ethnically balanced. Parties present lists of 
candidates for each GRC, and at least one member of the list must be non-Chinese, typically 
Malay or Indian.83 Voters cast their ballots for party lists, not individual candidates. Again, this 
design has an obvious good-government rationale, that of ensuring representation of Singapore’s 
                                                 
81 For background on these developments in the Singaporean election system, see Li-Ann Thio, 
The Post-Colonial Constitutional Evolution of the Singapore Legislature: A Case Study, 1993 
SINGAPORE J. LEGAL STUD. 80, 96-102. 
82 In 2011, according to the Singapore Parliament’s web-site, there were fifteen multi-member 
constituencies and twelve single-member constituencies.  See 
http://www.parliament.gov.sg/members-parliament. “Group Representation Constituency,” 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Group_Representation_Constituency, provides a good overview of 
the GRC system. 
83 The ethnicity is specified in the regulations governing the specific election. 
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minorities.84 The dominant Chinese population might win every parliamentary seat were all 
districts to be single-member, and even if minorities dominated in a few districts their 
representatives would be swamped in the parliament as a whole. The result of creating the GRCs, 
undoubtedly intended, was that the PAP won the district-wide elections in these constituencies, 
with a slate that did include minority representation. Even after the 2011 elections, the GRCs 
produced near-total domination of the PAP in parliament.85 
 The domination was only near-total, though, because of two other innovations in 
representation. The constitution was amended to require the appointment of a limited number – 
at present, up to nine – of “non-constituency members” (NCMPs) to parliament.86 NCMPs are 
                                                 
84 According to Kevin Tan, the GRC system was introduced “with the avowed objective of 
ensuring the representatioin of ethnic minorities in parliament.” Kevin Y.L. Tan, “Legal Issues,” 
in VOTING IN CHANGE, supra note ---, at 49, 52. 
85 Li-Ann Thio observes that the GRC system was also introduced for the purpose of recruiting 
new leadership to the PAP, allowing candidates who might not want to risk losing an election to 
ride the coattails of a popular politician at the head of the GRC ticket. Li-Ann Thio, “The 
Passage of a Generation: Revisiting the Report of the 1966 Constitutional Convention,” in 
EVOLUTION OF A REVOLUTION: FORTY YEARS OF THE SINGAPORE CONSTITUTION 7, 36-37 (Li-
Ann Thio & Kevin Y.L. Tan eds. 2009). 
86  The number actually appointed depends on the number of opposition members elected in 
constituencies. So, for example, because the opposition won six seats in the 2011 elections only 
three NCMPs were appointed to the Parliament. 
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“third class parliamentarians.”87 They can debate all matters and vote on most legislation, but not 
on the budget, and their participation in committee work is limited.  
The stated rationale for the NCMP system was “to ensure that there will be a minimum 
number of opposition representatives in Parliament and that views other than the Government's 
can be expressed in Parliament.”88 Under the NCMP system, appoinment is based on a formula 
requiring the appointment of the “best losers” – that is, the largest vote-gatherers in 
constituencies who nonetheless failed to be elected from a constituency. These are typically 
though not necessarily the leaders of the main opposition groups. Most have gone along with 
these appointments, albeit reluctantly.  
A second innovation was the creation in 1990 of a limited number – again, up to nine – of 
“nominated members” (NMPs). As the name indicates, these are people from outside of politics 
– academic leaders, leaders in the business community, and the like – appointed by the 
government to serve in parliament.89 The rationale for having NMPs is to break out of the 
possibly self-reinforcing effects of “group think” within political circles (which is to say, within 
the PAP) and relatedly to provide the opportunity for new ways of thinking to enter the political 
system. The system also responded to a widespread perception among PAP leaders that 
important segments of civil society were so disaffected from politics that they were not 
                                                 
87 Thio, supra note ---, at 46 (2002). 
88 http://www.parliament.gov.sg/members-parliament.  
89 Formally the appointments are made by the President (elected separately from the executive 
government) on the advice of a parliamentary select committee. So far the President has not 
exercised independent judgment on these appointments. 
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contributing as much as they could to the nation’s governance. The NMPs were a symbol of the 
government’s interest in the contributions civil society could make, signaling to the population 
generally that the government was open to new ways of thinking. More cynically, Garry Rodan 
suggests, “[t]his functional representation … encouraged non-governmental organizations … to 
take their politics down a non-partisan path though within a PAP-controlled institution,” 
apparently on the theory that NGOs hoping to have their members chosen as NMPs would 
abstain from open political opposition.90 
The government’s interest in creating NCMPs and NMPs has another source – an interest 
in coopting potential opposition.91 As one NMP told me, serving in parliament gave the member 
a greater understanding of the government’s difficulties in managing a multiethnic city-state. An 
NCMP leader of the opposition Workers Party also indicated in 2007 that serving in parliament 
at least rounded off the hard edges of the party’s positions.92 
Other aspects of Singapore’s electoral system, common in other regimes as well, 
reinforce the PAP’s ability to retain power. The official election period is quite short – nine days 
                                                 
90 Garry Rodan, “Singapore ‘Exceptionalism’?: Authoritarian Rule and State Transformation,” in  
POLITICAL TRANSITIONS IN DOMINANT PARTY SYSTEMS: LEARNING TO LOSE 232, 242 (Joseph 
Wong & Edward Friedman eds., 2008). The NCMPs are not truly “functional” representatives, 
because there is no obligation for the government to appoint NCMPs who are representatives of 
specific segments of civil society. 
91 Thio, supra note ---, at 31 n. 163 (2002). Professor Thio served as an NMP from 2007 to 2009. 
92 Sylvia Lim, “The Future of Alternative Party Politics: Growth or Extinction?,” in 
RENAISSANCE SINGAPORE?, supra note ---, at 239. Lim was elected to parliament in 2011. 
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between the opening of the campaign and the election – and formal campaigning is prohibited 
outside that window, although opposition parties continue to operate and distribute information 
about their positions.93 The government also engages in classic gerrymandering by redrawing 
constituency boundaries in anticipation of new elections, with an eye to diluting the opportunity 
for an opposition slate to gain a majority in a GRC.94 
 
F. Singapore’s Constitutionalism: Characterization and Assessment 
 Pluralizing the concept of constitutionalism while preserving some degree of analytic 
clarity poses problems of characterization. As the previous discussion of the “slice and dice” or 
disaggregated analysis of civil liberties in Singapore suggests,95 the most paradigmatic liberal 
constitutionalist nations regularly fall short of achieving full liberal rights along one or more 
dimensions. Despite those shortfalls, the nations still ought to be characterized as falling with the 
category of liberal constitutionalist nations. When, though, do the shortfalls become great 
enough to warrant placing the system in a different category? More concretely, is Singapore a 
seriously flawed liberal constitutionalist nation, or an authoritarian constitutionalist one?  
 As I indicated earlier, Singapore’s constitutional system is far from being that of a liberal 
democracy, and it clearly has authoritarian overtones. The use of “swords of Damocles” and the 
internalization of constraint by some as a result of long-standing and well-known instances of 
coercion of others may allow the government to assert control without obvious arbitrary 
                                                 
93 citation 
94 citation 
95 Text accompanying notes --- supra. 
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exercises of power. Yet, that point can be put another way: Perhaps we could describe 
Singapore’s authoritarianism as being exercised with a relatively light hand. Rather than 
electoral fraud, there is gentle and completely transparent manipulation of the formal electoral 
system. With some difficulty, political opponents can organize reasonably effectively. And, of 
course, while worrying about being forced into bankruptcy is not something opposition leaders 
welcome, neither is it much like being concerned, on waking up at home in the morning, that one 
will be spending the evening in prison. As Kenneth Paul Tan puts it, “Singapore is not a crudely 
authoritarian state, but neither does it fit neatly into the familiar theories of liberalization and 
democratization.”96 
 What might explain Singapore’s authoritarian constitutionalism? All sympathetic 
accounts of the system, whether from the PAP or independent academics, point to the 
government’s need to preserve ethnic and religious harmony. In Michael Hor’s words, “The need 
to preserve the peace between the racial components of Singaporean society is never far from 
official thinking.”97 As I have heard it described in quasi-racist terms, Singapore was “an island 
of red in a sea of green.”98 In a well-known speech, Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong described 
“the worst possible” outcome of an election as a “society split[] based on race or religion,” which 
                                                 
96 Kenneth Paul Tan, “Introduction,” in RENAISSANCE SINGAPORE?, supra note ---, at v. 
97 Hor, supra note ---, at 181. See also Rahul Sagar, “What Can We Learn from Singapore?,” 
unpub. Manuscript in author’s possession. 
98 “Green” here is rather clearly a reference to the Muslim populations in Indonesia and 
Malaysia, with “red” more obscurely referring to ethnic-origin Chinese, Buddhists, and 
Christians in Singapore. 
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would “divide the society and that is the end for Singapore.”99 As indicated above, some of the 
system’s institutional arrangements might plausibly be explained with reference to the need to 
manage ethnic tensions, with collateral (and intended) effects on the government’s self-
preservation.100 Yet, one might fairly wonder whether the scope of the restrictions on freedom is 
actually limited in ways that this justification would support. In particular, the government 
appears to treat all forms of political opposition as sufficiently likely to lead to racial or religious 
division that it is justified in restricting political opposition as such. Perhaps the government is 
right, given Singapore’s situation, but one might view its actions more skeptically as motivated 
by an instinct for political rather than national self-preservation.101 
 With this overview of Singapore’s constitutionalism in hand as an illustration of the 
possible value of pluralizing the notion of constitutionalism, I turn to an examination of some 
categories that might help organize such a pluralized notion. 
                                                 
99 Speech by Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong, April 5, 2011, available at 
http://www.pmo.gov.sg/content/pmosite/mediacentre/speechesninterviews/primeminister/2011/A
pril/Speech_by_Prime_Minister_Lee_Hsien_Loong_at_Kent_Ridge_Ministerial_Forum_2011.ht
ml#.UnhMQCeFcoo. 
100 The same might be said of some substantive policies, such as those dealing with the allocation 
of improvements in public services. For a discussion, see TAN --- infra. 
101 Cf. BARR & SKRBIS, note --- supra, at 252 (suggesting that “Singapore’s two main national 
myths – multiracialism and meritocracy – are chimeras whose main purpose is to facilitate and 
legitimise rule by a self-appointed elite, dominated by middle-class Chinese in general, and by 
the Lee family in particular.”). 
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III. Absolutist and Mere Rule-of-Law Constitutionalism 
A. Absolutist Constitutionalism 
Consider first the possibility of absolutist constitutionalism:  Imagine an absolute 
monarchy in which the monarch’s decisions are authoritative.102 The monarch makes decisions 
after receiving advice from a group of advisers s/he has personally chosen. The monarch chooses 
the advisers after consulting widely in the nation, by holding discussion sessions with the 
nation’s citizens.103 The monarch makes it clear that the advisers provide only advice, and that 
s/he will make the final decision. There are no mechanisms for formally challenging a decision 
once taken. But, the monarch allows widespread discussion of policy options before decisions 
are taken, and criticism of her/his choices afterwards. Sometimes such criticisms lead the 
monarch to modify the chosen policy, but not always. The monarch’s decisions are typically 
motivated by a combination of concerns – that the decision not undermine and perhaps actually 
enhance the monarchy’s stability (defined as the continuation of governance by the monarch and 
her/his designated successors), and that the decision promote the welfare of the nation’s citizens 
as the monarch understands their welfare. Finally, the monarch does her/his best to imbue 
potential successors – children, members of the more extended royal family – with the values 
that animate the monarch’s own choices. 
                                                 
102 The example is drawn from Bhutan’s recent history, but I emphasize that it is stylized, not 
historically accurate. 
103 Or, today, by inviting widespread participation in some sort of internet forum. 
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 This is an absolute monarchy, not a constitutional monarchy on the model of Great 
Britain or Denmark, but a monarchy that should be taken to satisfy the most minimal 
requirements of normative constitutionalism, and probably quite a bit more than that. The 
example suggests that McIlwain’s dichotomization between will and law misses something: The 
absolute monarch exercises her/his will, but not despotically (even in the long run), and does not 
engage in arbitrary rule even though the monarch is not limited by law.104 If that is correct, the 
example suggests normative constitutionalism may require a substantial degree of freedom of 
expression and some informal mechanisms for determining what a nation’s citizens believe to be 
in their interests, but not, importantly, a full-fledged system of democratic representation and 
accountability. 
 
B. Rule-of-Law Constitutionalism 
                                                 
104 To be clear: The monarch is not institutionally constrained to refrain from acting arbitrarily, 
and for that reason one might say that the monarch’s behavior is not “constitutionalist.” Whether 
restraint due to socialization rather than institutions ought to be regarded as enough to qualify a 
regime as constitutionalist is an interesting and important question for the pluralizing project. 
Reflecting on the literature on political constitutionalism, at present I am inclined to think that 
socialization that substantially reduces the risk of arbitrary action should count as 
constitutionalist. For examples of that literature, see RICHARD BELLAMY, POLITICAL 
CONSTITUTIONALISM: A REPUBLICAN DEFENCE OF THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF DEMOCRACY 
(2007); THE LEGAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS: SCEPTICAL ESSAYS (Keith Ewing et al., eds. 
2011).  
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(1) The basic requirements of mere rule-of-law constitutionalism. Mere rule-of-law 
constitutionalism is another variant. Mere rule-of-law constitutionalism is a system that satisfies 
such core rule-of-law requirements as publicity, prospectivity, and generality.105 Consider a 
stylized example of a system that satisfies those requirements but is not fully normatively 
                                                 
105 The list is of course taken from LON FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW (1964). Fuller includes 
eight items in his list of the rule of law’s characteristics, and I limit my example to those in the 
text solely for expository reasons. Fuller appears to believe that legal systems that conform to the 
rule of law are highly likely (or even certain) to conform as well to full normative 
constitutionalism understood more thickly, incidentally though not definitionally or deductively. 
See also T.R.S. Allan, “”Accountability to Law, in ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE CONTEMPORARY 
CONSTITUTION 77, 85 (Nicholas Bamforth & Peter Leyland eds., forthcoming 2014) 
(“Compliance with the rules of natural justice … is as important an aspect of the rule of law as 
the conformity of enacted rules with the constraints of formal or procedural legality (generality, 
clarity, publication, prospective effect and so forth.”). But see id. at 90 (suggesting that this 
analysis is “an attempt to understand  [aspects of] … the specific conditions of the British legal 
and political order.”). For a recent contribution to the discussion of whether the concept of the 
rule of law necessarily incorporates some fundamental human rights, see Peter Rijpkema, The 
Rule of Law Beyond Thick and Thin, 32 L. & PHIL. 793 (2013) (arguing that the criteria Fuller 
and others identify as defining characteristics of the rule of law are predicated on a conception of 
those subject to law’s directives that implies that they have fundamental rights). This Article is 
not the place to develop my view that this is mistaken, although the very enterprise of describing 
mere rule-of-law and authoritarian constitutionalism rests on that view. 
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constitutionalist.106 The government arrests a critic, charging him with violating a statute 
prohibiting the public distribution of statements likely to cause racial disharmony, by publishing 
a newspaper editorial criticizing the government’s policies on affirmative action. The judge 
before whom the prosecution is brought dismisses the prosecution on the ground that the 
editorial did not violate the statute because it was unlikely to cause racial disharmony. The judge 
orders the critic released. As the police are completing the paperwork to accomplish the release 
and then putting the critic in a taxicab to take him home, the government passes a new statute 
making it a crime to criticize government policies on affirmative action. The statute defines 
“criticizing” to include the failure to withdraw from public access statements made before the 
statute’s enactment. When the critic steps out of the taxicab at his house, the police arrest him for 
violating the new statute.107 Holding the critic liable is, I believe, consistent with the minimal 
requirements of the rule of law: The new statute is public, general, prospective, and capable of 
                                                 
106 The example is loosely based on an incident in Singapore’s constitutional history, modified to 
bring out “mere rule-of-law” features. The case on which it draws is Chng Suan Tze v. Minister 
of Home Affairs, [1989] 1 MLJ 69 (Singapore Court of Appeal). For details on the Chng case, 
see Thio, supra note ---, at 58-60.  
107 Assume that the critic has a cell phone with him in the taxicab, so that he could receive notice 
of the new statute’s adoption and could direct supporters to withdraw the editorial from public 
availability. 
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being complied with.108 But, I think it clear that the government’s action is inconsistent with full 
normative constitutionalism.  
Now generalize the government’s behavior, so that the example is not a simple one of a 
violation occurring within a normatively constitutionalist system but is rather a typical example: 
The government is alert to challenges, does its best to anticipate them, alters the laws in place 
whenever it discovers a problem but does so consistent with the requirements of publicity, 
generality, prospectivity, and the like. We then have mere rule-of-law constitutionalism.109 As 
with absolutist constitutionalism, mere rule-of-law constitutionalism conforms to some of 
McIlwain’s criteria but not others: The government is limited by law and, to the extent that it 
                                                 
108 Fuller’s list requires some degree of stability in law. A single modification provoked by a 
newly perceived problem would not, I think, be inconsistent with that requirement. 
109 In my judgment Gordon Silverstein, “Singapore: The Exception that Proves Rules Matter,” in 
RULE BY LAW: THE POLITICS OF COURTS IN AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES 73-101(Tom Ginsburg & 
Tamir Moustafa eds., 2008), ascribes rule-of-law constitutionalism, not authoritarian 
constitutionalism, to Singapore. See also Carlo Guarnieri, “Judicial Independence in 
Authoritarian Regimes: Lessons from Continental Europe,” in JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN 
CHINA: LESSONS FOR GLOBAL RULE OF LAW PROMOTION (Randall Peerenboom ed. 2010), 233, 
243 (defining “a ‘thin’ version of the rule of law” to mean that “political power must follow 
general rules and, although it can alter those rules, it can do so only following previously enacted 
procedures”), 245 (relying on Silverstein, supra, for the suggestion that Singapore has a “thin” 
version of the rule of law). 
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responds to challenges only after the event, perhaps we ought not describe it as completely 
despotic, and yet the government seems not truly limited or non-arbitrary at least in potential. 
I have not described the mechanism by which the rulers of a mere rule-of-law regime are 
chosen. But, they could be chosen in reasonably free and fair elections. Both political theory and 
empirical observation suggest that we cannot rule out in advance the possibility that large, even 
overwhelming majorities within a defined population will prefer illiberal policies. If they do, 
mere rule-of-law constitutionalism can be created and sustained through reasonably free and fair 
elections. We can then describe the systems as illiberal democracies.110 
(2) A note on judicial independence as a component of mere rule-of-law 
constitutionalism. Jeremy Waldron and others have suggested that “mere” rule-of-law 
constitutionalism requires more than prospectivity and the like. For Waldron institutions 
associated with an independent judiciary are essential components of the most minimal rule-of-
                                                 
110 See ZAKARIA, supra note ---. Graham Walker, “The Idea of Nonliberal Constitutionalism,” in 
NOMOS XXXIX: ETHNICITY AND GROUP RIGHTS 154 (Ian Shapiro & Will Kymlicka eds. 1997), 
uses the term in a philosophically grounded account that treats “liberal constitutionalism” as 
resting on a philosophical commitment to neutrality among views of the good and a consequent 
commitment to purely individual rights. As a result, he treats Israel as a (possibly) illiberal 
constitutional state. See, e.g., id. at 159. For my more institutionally oriented purposes, Graham’s 
account sweeps too much into the category of illiberal constitutionalism. See also TAN notes --- 
infra [Asian values discussion]. 
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law state.111 Yet, even adding independent courts to the requirements does not add much, in my 
view, once we examine the idea of judicial independence in more detail.112 First, the desideratum 
is not judicial independence alone, but rather judicial independence coupled with accountability 
to law.113 Accountability to law, in turn, consists in making decisions that are palpably legal – 
that rely on materials and use methods of reasoning that all well-socialized lawyers would treat 
as legal in nature. On this understanding of accountability to law, such accountability necessarily 
has a sociological component. In some legal systems, decisions referring to revealed truths 
would be palpably legal, in others not. 
Consider then a legal system in which judges are generally socialized into accepting 
positivist accounts of law as correct. In such a system Waldron’s requirement that a rule-of-law 
state have independent judges accountable to law adds little to the basic requirements of 
prospectivity and the like, at least as long as the judges can dispose of their cases solely with 
reference to positive law. 
                                                 
111 Jeremy Waldron, “The Rule of Law and the Importance of Procedure,” in NOMOS L: GETTING 
TO THE RULE OF LAW 3 (James Fleming ed. 2011). In the text I discuss only judicial 
independence, but I believe that other features of Waldron’s account either are parasitic on 
judicial independence or are subject to difficulties analogous to the ones I discuss. 
112 The next few sentences summarize an argument made in more detail in Mark Tushnet, 
“Judicial Accountability in Comparative Perspective,” in ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE 
CONTEMPORARY CONSTITUTION 57, 68-72 (Nicholas Bamforth & Peter Leyland eds., 
forthcoming 2014). 
113 Without the latter, independent judges can act arbitrarily and so anti-constitutionally. 
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But, perhaps even positivist judges will regularly confront cases falling into the 
interstices of positive law. A Singaporean case is instructive. The background is the famous 
British case of Liversidge v. Anderson. 114 That case involved an internal security statute 
authorizing the Home Secretary to place in detention camps people as to whom he had 
reasonable cause to believe had hostile associations. The court of appeal held that the statute 
required only that the Home Secretary have such a belief – a so-called “subjective” test – and did 
not require that the belief be objectively reasonable. The Singaporean parallel is Chng Suan Tze 
v. Minister of Home Affairs.115 The relevant statute there authorized detention if the President 
“was satisfied” that detention was necessary to prevent the person from disrupt national security. 
The Singapore Court of Appeal held that it was insufficient that the President be subjectively 
satisfied that the detainee posed a threat. Rather, there had to be some objective basis for that 
belief. The problem in Liversidge and Chng arises in what I have called the interstices of positive 
law, here the failure of the positive law to set out whether the test is subjective or objective. 
Even a positivist judge can infuse substance – here, a preference for liberty – in these 
interstices. But, in a mere rule-of-law state, the government can fill the gap once it is brought to 
its attention, as indeed happened in Singapore: Parliament responded to the Chng decision by 
amending the relevant statute to make it clear that the test was a purely subjective one.116 
Thereafter a positivist judge would be bound to follow the positive law. 
                                                 
114 [1942] AC 206. 
115 [1989] 1 MLJ 69 (Singapore Court of Appeal). 
116 Citation. For an analogous example, see TEO SOH LUNG, BEYOND THE BLUE GATE: 
RECOLLECTIONS OF A POLITICAL PRISONER 188-94 (2011) (describing the author’s momentary 
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In sum, judicial independence is an important additional component to mere rule-of-law 
constitutionalism only if we assume that judges are not positivists.117 That might be true in some 
societies, but it is rather clearly a contingent feature of judging that will depend on a range of 
sociological considerations, including such matters as how the judges are trained and promoted. 
(3) Is mere rule-of-law constitutionalism “constitutionalism” in the proper sense? One 
could of course stipulate that the term “constitutionalism” applies only when some substantive 
requirements are satisfied. What substantive requirements, though? Waldron offers the following 
list to contrast it with the formal requirements of prospectivity and the like and with the 
procedural requirement of an independent but accountable judiciary: “Respect for private 
property; Prohibitions on torture and brutality; A presumption of liberty; and Democratic 
                                                                                                                                                             
release from detention because of a technical defect in the detention order, followed immediately 
by serving her with a new detention order in which the technical defect was corrected). The cited 
book is a memoir of the detention of a participant in the so-called “Marxist Plot,” discussed at 
text accompanying notes --- supra. 
117 I note two qualifications to the argument developed in the text. (1) Perhaps a direct face-to-
face confrontation with a litigant will push even a positivist judge into responding in a non-
positivist way. (2) Perhaps substantive decisions made in the interstices of positive law will 
initiate a dynamic that adds more and more substance to the purely procedural elements of mere 
rule-of-law constitutionalism. For a discussion of a related possibility, see text accompanying 
notes --- infra. I am sufficiently skeptical about both of these possibilities to regard them as at 
best modest qualifications to the overall argument. 
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enfranchisement.”118 The point of the contrast is to suggest that any substantive requirements are 
going to be substantially more controversial that the minimal formal and procedural ones. Add 
anything of substance, in short, and you have more than the mere rule of law. 
Still, perhaps the mere rule of law is not constitutionalist at all. Here I revert to 
McIlwain’s definition, that constitutionalism requires (no more than) restraint on the arbitrary 
exercise of power. Proponents of the mere rule of law argue, I believe, correctly, that it does 
constrain arbitrariness in the sense of whim and caprice. On McIlwain’s definition, the mere rule 
of law is therefore constitutionalist. It is of course an exceedingly thin constitutionalism, but if 
we are willing to pluralize the idea of constitutionalism, even an exceedingly thin version might 
be a distinctive form of constitutionalism. 
 
IV. Constitutions, Courts, and Elections In Authoritarian Societies 
 Most of the scholarship by political scientists on constitutions in authoritarian regimes is 
analytically descriptive rather than normative, although it is written against a normative 
backdrop: If constitutionalism entails limitations on government, and authoritarian regimes are 
ones in which government is unlimited, why do such regimes even have constitutions? Of course 
every regime has a descriptive constitution, some reasonably regular processes for policy 
development and conflict resolution.119 Yet, the literature on hybrid regimes seems animated by 
                                                 
118 Waldron, supra note ---, at 7. 
119 For a discussion of the term “constitution” in a descriptive sense, see Mark Tushnet, 
“Constitutions,” in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (Michel 
Rosenfeld & Andras Sajo, eds., 2012). See also Michael Albertus & Victor Menaldo, Dictators 
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an interest in understanding why such regimes have constitutions that appear to go beyond 
merely mapping out power relations within the government and yet are not mere shams.120 For 
present purposes, even if this account of some motivations for this literature is inaccurate, 
analytic descriptions of constitutions in hybrid regimes illuminate some features of authoritarian 
constitutionalism. 
 
A. Strategic Accounts of Courts and Constitutionalism under Authoritarianism 
The most prominent accounts of courts and constitutionalism in nations with 
authoritarian governments are strategic or instrumental.121 These accounts purport to show that, 
from their own point of view, authoritarian leaders benefit from creating independent courts or, 
more generally, by tying their own hands through constitutional restraints. To frame the 
                                                                                                                                                             
as Founding Fathers? The Role of Constitutions Under Autocracy, 24 ECON. & POL. 279 (2012) 
(arguing that autocrats adopt constitutions to specify the “rights” of members of the autocratic 
coalition, apparently using the term rights to refer to the prerogatives attached to the positions 
created by the constitution.).  
120 On the idea of constitutions as maps of power, see [Okoth-Okendo?]. The 1936 Constitution 
of the Soviet Union is the usual example of a sham constitution, but there are many additional 
examples in recent years. For a general discussion, see Law & Versteeg, note --- supra. 
121 For the terminology, see, e.g., STEPHEN HOLMES, “The Constitution of Sovereignty in Jean 
Bodin,” in PASSIONS AND CONSTRAINT: ON THE THEORY OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY 110 (1995), 
(referring to “strategically designed limitations on supreme power” and “restraints as instruments 
of princely authority.”). 
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discussion I use Moustafa and Ginsburg’s catalogue of the “functions of courts in authoritarian 
states”:  
Courts are used to (1) establish social control and sideline political opponents, (2) bolster 
a regime’s claim to “legal” legitimacy, (3) strengthen administrative compliance within 
the state’s own bureaucratic machinery and solve coordination problems among 
competing factions within the regime, (4) facilitate trade and investment, and (5) 
implement controversial policies so as to allow political distance from core elements of 
the regime.122 
A standard example is the creation of a seemingly independent constitutional court in 
Egypt under Sadat and Mubarak.123 Those leaders faced domestic opposition and international 
skepticism about their policy of shifting Egypt from a semi-socialist system to one committed to 
market liberalization. To assure international lenders that their capital would be protected against 
expropriation, the leaders created a constitutional court with the power to hold expropriations 
unconstitutional, and with judges independent of direct control by the regime.124  
                                                 
122 Tamir Moustafa & Tom Ginsburg, “Introduction: The Functions of Courts in Authoritarian 
Politics,” in Ginsburg & Moustafa, supra note ---, at 4. 
123 See, e.g., TAMIR MOUSTAFA, THE STRUGGLE FOR CONSTITUTIONAL POWER: LAW, POLITICS, 
AND DEVELOPMENT IN EGYPT (2007). 
124 See also K. Shanmugam, The Rule of Law in Singapore, 2012 SINGAPORE J. LEGAL STUD. 
357, 357  (“Foreign investment would only come if we could provide the necessary legal 
certainty. In that sense the Rule of Law was for us not only an aspiration and an ideal (important 
in itself), but also a necessity borne out of exigency.”) Shanmugan, Singapore’s Minister for 
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Putting the argument in general terms: Authoritarian regimes have the power to 
expropriate property at will. Knowing that, investors will be reluctant to invest in the nation. The 
regime can provide investors with the assurance that their investments will not be expropriated 
by embedding a guarantee against the relevant kinds of expropriation in the constitution, and 
then by establishing courts to enforce that guarantee: “[B]y establishing a neutral institution to 
monitor and punish violations of property rights, the state can make credible its promise to keep 
its hands off.”125 
The difficulty, which arises in different forms with respect to each component of the 
functionalist or instrumentalist account, lies in explaining why the promise is a credible one, and 
is again exemplified by the Egyptian experience. The neutral institution – the combination of a 
constitution and a court enforcing the constitution – is said to make the promise credible. But, 
just as an authoritarian regime can revoke its promise when its rulers believe that doing so would 
be to their advantage, so can it eliminate the neutral institution at the same time. If the regime 
finds the institution useful for other purposes, it can manipulate the court’s jurisdiction and 
                                                                                                                                                             
Foreign Affairs and Minister for Law when he made this statement, refers to the rule of law only, 
but I believe the statement can fairly be read to support an interpretation that goes beyond the 
“mere” rule of law. 
125 Moustafa & Ginsburg, supra note ---, at 8. 
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personnel,126 or modify the constitution in a targeted way, to allow the institution to serve – at 
least momentarily – those other purposes. 
Yet, at this point we can see a classic problem of unraveling. Investors learn that the 
promise was not credible when the regime eliminates the institution’s neutrality to allow 
expropriation. Observing that development, all those targeted by the other functions, such as 
securing legitimation or delegating controversial reforms, should anticipate similar responses 
whenever the constitution or the courts impede rather than promote the regime’s goals.127 
Knowing that, the targets should not give any special weight to the constitution and courts even 
when the regime does not interfere with them. Manipulating the constitution or the courts’ 
jurisdiction with respect to investment and expropriation reveals “the man behind the curtain” 
with respect to delegating controversial reforms as well. 
Strategic arguments may account for the creation of seemingly independent courts, but I 
suggest that these accounts are flawed because they do not take seriously enough two central 
features of authoritarianism: The authoritarian leader’s substantive policy preferences need not 
                                                 
126 See Steven Levitsky & Lucan Way, The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism, 13 JOURNAL 
OF DEMOCRACY 51, 56 (2002) (listing impeachment, bribery, extortion, and co-optation as 
techniques for manipulating the judiciary). I would add manipulation of jurisdiction to their list. 
127 See, e.g., “Judicial professionalism in China: past, present, and future,” in PROSPECTS FOR THE 
PROFESSIONS IN CHINA, supra note ---, at 78, 90 (discussing the use of the courts by local 
administrators to “deal with ‘hard cases’ … to solve administrative headaches”). To the extent 
that the sources of the headaches know that the local administrators are simply using the courts, 
it is unclear why they would divert blame from the administrators to the courts. 
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be “steady,” to use a term introduced by Stephen Holmes,128 and the authoritarian leader has 
lawful power to alter constitutional provisions at will. Writing of Singapore, Ross Worthington 
makes the point: “the Singapore Constitution is essentially a plaything of executive whim; a rule 
book for running the school which the council of prefects, with the connivance of the 
headmaster, may change at will.”129 
The general structure of my argument is this: If the authoritarian regime’s preferences are 
“steady,” the mechanisms of constitutionalism and courts do no work, because the regime’s 
immediate self-interest will lead it to refrain from actions that reduce the returns it anticipates to 
gain during the period when the preferences are stable. And, if the regime’s preferences change, 
the mechanisms also do no work because the regime is free to change them to accommodate its 
new preferences.130 That the regime is free to change its preferences is important, because that 
                                                 
128 Holmes, supra note ---, at 111 (“limitations placed upon his caprice markedly increase his 
capacity to govern and to achieve his steady aims.”). 
129 ROSS WORTHINGTON, GOVERNANCE IN SINGAPORE 68 (2003). See also STEPHEN H. HABER, 
ARMANDO RAZO & NOEL MAURER, THE POLITICS OF PROPERTY RIGHTS: POLITICAL INSTABILITY, 
CREDIBLE COMMITMENTS, AND ECONOMIC GROWTH IN MEXICO, 1876-1929, at 4 (2003) (“The 
theoretical problem is that the despot’s commitment to protect property rights is purely 
volitional.”). 
130 Perhaps there is a class of preference changes as to which the mechanisms would do some 
work – changes that the regime might desire to make at the moment but will realize thereafter 
reduced returns. This is a classic problem of short-sightedness or akrasia, about which there is a 
large and difficult literature. For an introduction, see Sarah Stroud, “Weakness of Will,” The 
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freedom makes it impossible for the current beneficiaries of its constitutional restraints even to 
calculate the probability that the regime will continue to adhere to its preferences for some 
defined period. To revert to the Egyptian example: Investors cannot know or even evaluate 
probabilistically when the regime’s leaders will decide that, all things considered, they will be 
better off expropriating the investments and “take the money and run.”131 They therefore cannot 
rationally rely on the regime’s current assurances, which in turn means that the regime cannot 
use those assurances for the assumed instrumental purposes.132 
                                                                                                                                                             
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2008 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), available at 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/weakness-will/. For present purposes I note 
that it is extremely difficult for a person knowing of the possibility that she will be short-sighted 
to design institutions for herself that will foreclose the possibility of making short-sighted 
decisions but not ones that, on considered reflection, will be thought appropriate. (The difficulty 
is that any such institution will have to identify two categories – short-sighted and therefore 
prohibited and not-short-sighted and therefore permitted – and at the moment of decision the 
decision-maker will, by definition, place the decision in the second category.)  
131 Idi Amin (Uganda) and Zine El Abidine Ben Ali (Tunisia) are examples of dictators who did 
take the money and run, both to Saudi Arabia. 
132 The argument in the text is an informal version of the “last period” problem that leads to 
unraveling in prisoners’ dilemma games with a limited but unknown number of iterations. 
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Examining the Egyptian example in more detail illustrates the difficulty with purely 
instrumental accounts of courts and constitutions in authoritarian regimes.133 When the Egyptian 
constitutional court began to act against regime interests, Mubarak sharply limited its 
independence by packing the court with his supporters.134 Importantly, the investors who were 
supposed to assured about expropriation could have anticipated this possibility from the outset. 
That is, given the regime’s authoritarianism the possibility existed from the beginning that 
judicial independence would persist only as long as it served the regime’s interests, and that 
neither the constitutional constraints nor the constitutional court would tie the regime’s hands 
were the regime to become interested in expropriation.135  
                                                 
133 For ease of exposition I use the example of guarantees against expropriation, but the argument 
holds with respect to other guarantees of constitutional rights. 
134 For the details, see Clark B. Lombardi, Egypt’s Constitutional Court: Managing 
Constitutional Conflict in an Authoritarian, Aspirationally ‘Islamic’ State, 3 J. COMPAR. L. 234, 
250-51 (2008). 
135 The strategic account makes sense only if we – or the “targets” of the strategy, here 
international investors – have a time horizon shorter than that of the authoritarian regime. If so, 
investors can get their money out before the regime’s policy changes. But, the regime’s time 
horizon is unknowable, because at any moment the regime’s leaders can take the money and run 
– that is, calculate that they will be better off by immediately converting all their political power 
into financial resources and “retiring” to some friendly location, than by retaining power so as to 
maintain in-coming flows of financial resources. Perhaps many leaders of authoritarian regimes 
will make the latter choice, but investors – and citizens more generally – cannot know they will. 
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After sketching Holmes’s argument and offering some criticisms of it, I turn to recent 
strategic accounts of courts in authoritarian societies, and conclude this section with a discussion 
of strategic accounts of constitutionalism’s benefits to authoritarian rulers. 
 
B. The Strategic Benefits of Constitutionalism to Absolutist Rulers 
 Holmes’s work aims at uncovering some of the intellectual sources of the theory of 
liberal democracy. He analyzes the work of the “preliberal and nondemocratic theorist” Jean 
Bodin as the vehicle for laying out the now-familiar argument that liberal democracies can 
empower the people by taking some potentially contentious issues out of ordinary politics by 
placing them in a constitution that restricts the ordinary legislature’s ability to modify the policy 
chosen by the constitution’s framers.136 Because Bodin was not a liberal democrat, Bodin’s 
arguments, as presented by Holmes, were addressed to absolutist rulers: Their absolutism could 
                                                                                                                                                             
 Why then do investors invest, especially in large-scale capital projects where the returns 
will come only over a long period? One possibility is irrationality on their part. Another is that 
they believe that the regime is interested in more than maximizing its leaders’ personal returns 
(measured by some combination of power and income). That is, they believe that the regime’s 
“steady” preferences include national economic development. But, if the regime’s preference set 
can be expanded in that way, to generate an instrumental justification for constitutionalist 
commitments, we ought to consider the possibility that it can be expanded in addition to include 
a normative commitment to constitutionalism as such – in which case we would no longer need 
an instrumental account for constitutionalism in authoritarian states. 
136 Holmes, supra note ---, at 100. 
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be enhanced by self-imposed restrictions on power. Holmes quotes John Plamenatz’s description 
of the “paradox”: “the king could not rule efficiently without devices to retard his actions.”137 
 The structure of the argument is familiar, though not often laid out in full. At time-1, 
when a constitution is adopted (or an absolutist ruler considers whether to tie his or her hands), 
the constitution-makers know that there is a set of policy issues as to which their own judgments 
might not be best for all time: Their own judgment is that they must leave some decisions open 
to modification in the future. Suppose they believe that their own judgments about the structure 
of the legislature and about tax and spending policy are within the set of judgments that might 
not be best for all time. Should they leave both issues open to modification? The hands-tying 
argument is that they need not, that by foreclosing reconsideration of one issue through ordinary 
legislation they make it possible to arrive at better policy on the second. Suppose that both the 
legislature’s structure and tax and spending policy are open to modification by ordinary 
legislation. Political bargaining may lead to compromises with respect to both topics. But, if the 
issue of legislative structure is taken off the table by placing it in the constitution (even though 
the constitutionalized structure might not be better at time-2 than some politically available 
alternative), deliberations and bargaining over tax and spending policy might yield so much 
better outcomes with respect to those matters as to offset the inability to make improvements in 
the legislature’s structure.138 
                                                 
137 Id. at 108. 
138 I think that this argument works only on the assumption that the constitution’s resolutions of 
the issues it takes off the table (allowing modification through an amendment process more 
difficult than the one used to enact ordinary legislation) remains “good enough” in this sense: At 
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 This structure of this argument makes sense, though I wonder how often the empirical 
predicates necessary for its success are actually satisfied. Note, though, that its success requires 
that there be policy costs associated with bargaining and deliberation over policy choices: The 
tradeoffs between policy on legislative structure and tax and spending policy yield worse policies 
on both matters (net) than would result from accepting a “good enough” legislative structure and 
devoting all the available political energy to tax and spending policy. On the face of things, the 
argument might seem inapplicable to absolutist rulers, who – one might think – need not engage 
in bargaining at time-2.  
 But, as Holmes points out, even absolutist rulers need some degree of cooperation from 
their subjects: “If a sovereign breaks his word too often and too frivolously, … his word will 
become useless as a tool for mobilizing cooperation.”139 Barry Weingast developed this 
argument in some detail.140 Weingast asks us to consider a leader who is not, for the moment, 
constrained in exercising power by any legal rules. Still, the leader may be constrained in 
                                                                                                                                                             
time-2 those resolutions are suboptimal relative to alternatives, but the benefits of allowing 
modification through ordinary legislation of the non-constitutionalized policies offset the losses 
at time-2 associated with the inability to modify through ordinary legislation the 
constitutionalized ones. 
139 Holmes, supra note ---, at 111. For a discussion of mechanisms for mobilizing cooperation 
other “his word,” see [section on cooptation] below. 
140 Barry Weingast, The Political Foundations of Democracy and the Rule of Law, 91 AM. 
POLITICAL SCI. REV. 245 (1997). My description omits many technical details, but I do not think 
that doing so for expository purposes invalidates my basic point. 
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practice because those over whom she rules have enough practical power to resist impositions 
with which they disagree. Ordinarily, no single subject will have enough power to overthrow the 
leader, but some groups might, if they can act together. Yet, they will have a problem 
coordinating their action, for standard reasons: Each one will hold back, hoping that others will 
take the initiative and overthrow the leader, bringing to them – but not to the laggards – the costs 
of rebellion. They can coordinate their action if it is “common knowledge” that some action by 
the leader violates standards accepted by all (or most) subjects. Roughly, they all know that they 
all will treat some specific action by the leader as a signal that the time for rebellion has come. 
So, for example, a single act of confiscation can be understood as a threat to the property of all. 
Generalized: Some notion of constitutionalism, perhaps rather thin, provides a coordination 
mechanism by identifying actions by the leader that all (or enough) subjects will agree are 
“violations” that threaten them all. A written constitution can serve as a focal point for this 
coordination. 
The difficulty with this argument is that leaders will rarely announce that they are 
“violating” agreed-upon rules. Many constitutional provisions will be stated in rather general 
terms – requiring “just” compensation for takings for public purposes, for example, the scare 
quotes indicating that sometimes a ruler might be able to represent the just compensation for an 
expropriation as zero. The constitution taken as a whole is likely to provide support – within 
itself – for legally plausible arguments that something a critic identifies as a “violation” is 
actually consistent with the system as a whole, and therefore no threat to the rule of law – and, 
importantly, therefore no threat to other members of the potential opposition coalition. If 
participants in the system cannot unambiguously identify actions as violations, the breaches of 
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the constitution cannot serve as a signal that people should now coordinate cooperative action 
against the leader.  
Some actions might be unambiguous, such as patently arbitrary imprisonment or 
systematic extrajudicial killings.141 But, again, the word “patently” does a great deal of work 
here: Typically the leader will offer reasons, from within the complex rule system, that – if 
accepted – would justify the imprisonment, removing it from the “patently arbitrary” category. 
Put another way, some violations might be treated as unambiguous, but only at the cost of 
arbitrariness on the subjects’ part. That is, treating such an action as a violation requires that 
subjects ignore reasoned arguments that the action is consistent with the constitution as 
embodied in a relatively thick set of rules in place. 
The examples I have given of “good government” justifications for various developments 
in Singaporean law such as the creation of GRCs and the stringent libel laws illustrate how legal 
arguments can obfuscate what otherwise might be generally understood as “violations.” Perhaps 
the departure from tradition will trigger inquiry into whether the change signals the possibility of 
other, more bothersome changes, or put another way, triggers an inquiry into whether a 
“violation” has occurred or is likely to occur. And, perhaps the regime will find the costs of 
responding to such an inquiry too great to bear. Yet, the costs are simply the costs of making 
reason-based arguments, which do not seem to me likely to be high. Of course critics will treat 
the good-government justifications as pretexts for what are actually moves toward 
                                                 
141 Mauzy, supra note ---, at 55-56, uses the absence of such examples to show that Singapore’s 
is not a fully authoritarian regime. 
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authoritarianism, perhaps with a tinge of admiration for “[a]rtful or skillful manipulation.”142 Not 
all potential regime opponents will be that cynical (or sophisticated), and the good-government 
justifications might be sufficient to shift an action from the “violation” category into the 
“development of the law consistent with constitutionalism” category.  
Consider in this connection two examples. (1) The Law Society of Singapore tried to 
treat the abolition of criminal juries as a departure from inherited traditions that signaled a 
broader movement toward authoritarianism.143 But, the change was not understood as a 
“violation” in Weingast’s sense because the abolition of jury trials could reasonably be portrayed 
as promoting efficient law enforcement and as resembling developments elsewhere. 
(2) Even where constitutional provisions are clearly and are clearly aimed at obstructing 
the development of authoritarian rule, eliminating such restrictions might not qualify as a 
violation either. Experience with constitutionally entrenched term limits for presidents shows 
that lengthening or eliminating such limits by constitutionally authorized means may not readily 
be treated, at least widely enough, as a violation.144 The reason is that the changes are made in 
apparent compliance with the constitution, not against it – even though the changes might be 
“anti-constitutional” in some sense. 
                                                 
142 Id. at 58. 
143 Citation. 
144 See text accompanying notes --- infra (discussing the restructuring of Venezuela’s 
constitution in an authoritarian direction by means of mechanisms said to be authorized by the 
constitution). 
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Still another related argument is this. The leader provides enough benefits to a key 
segment of the potential opposition coalition to “buy off” opposition and thereby protect her 
position.145 Put another way, there is an “authoritarian coalition” coordinated by the authoritarian 
party and containing key groups such as the business community or the military or labor unions. 
Any group with enough independent power to threaten the authoritarian party is paid off to stay 
within the coalition, while those without such power are kept out. The success of this “divide and 
rule” strategy requires, first, that the leader have enough resources to buy off the key segment of 
the potential opposition,146 and, more important for my purposes, that the key segments believe – 
probably erroneously – that the leader cannot identify, in sequence, one, then another, key 
segment to buy off. If members in the key segment understand the possibility of a sequential 
divide-and-rule strategy, the strategy will unravel for reasons outlined above. 
With this general background, I turn now to a more detailed examination of the 
instrumental uses in authoritarian regimes of courts and other institutional features associated 
with constitutionalism. 
 
C. Courts in Authoritarian Nations  
 Functional or instrumentalist or strategic accounts of law, courts, and constitutions are 
subject to important instabilities, which are especially acute in connection with authoritarian 
                                                 
145 This model is developed in HABER ET AL., supra note ---. 
146 The common observation that the PAP’s success in Singapore depends on achieving and 
sustaining a high enough level of material prosperity might be taken to support the view that the 
PAP is pursuing this strategy, and must do so. 
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regimes. The general point, already made, is simple: Such regimes will use law, courts, and 
constitutions to achieve these goals only so long as doing so serves the regime’s interests. And, 
because the regime is authoritarian it faces no constraints on abandoning law, courts, and 
constitutionalism when doing that would serve the regime’s interests – or, perhaps more 
interestingly, when law, courts, and constitutionalism appear to be interfering with the regime’s 
(other) goals. 
 One difficulty with the various strategic accounts of constitutions and judicial review in 
authoritarian nations is that they generally do not take the characteristics of authoritarianism 
fully into account. They describe constitutions as credible commitments by the authoritarian 
rulers, and judicial review as a mechanism by which some elements of the ruling coalition can 
monitor the activities of others, typically the chief executive’s activities.147 But, it is puzzling 
how the commitments can be credible for more than a short period. The authoritarian leader – or, 
more generally, the dominant party in a dominant-party state – can modify the constitution at 
will, restrict the jurisdiction of the courts, or even replace the sitting judges.148 Strategic accounts 
ignore the possibility that the authoritarian ruler will be able to amend the constitution pursuant 
                                                 
147 See, e.g.,  
148 Cf. Matthew Stephenson, “When the Devil Turns…”: The Political Foundations of 
Independent Judicial Review, 32 J. LEG. STUD. 59 (2003) (arguing that party competition is 
required for the existence of stable forms of judicial independence). 
64 
 
to its own terms, or will have enough power to ignore the constitution’s amendment processes 
and change it extralegally.149  
(1) Strategic Accounts of Constitutionalism in Authoritarian Societies and the Question 
of Abusive Constitutionalism. Recent examples of what David Landau calls “abusive 
constitutionalism” illustrate the possibility that political leaders with large majorities will modify 
their nation’s constitutions to entrench themselves permanently.150 That possibility shows why 
strategic or instrumental accounts of constitutionalism in authoritarian regimes cannot tell the 
whole story.151 
                                                 
149 There may be an emerging norm of international law that nations are obligated to follow their 
own constitutions. See Rosalind Dixon & Vicki C. Jackson, Constitutions Inside Out: Ousider 
Interventions in Domestic Constitutional Contests, --- WAKE FOREST L. REV. --- (2012), for a 
presentation of material suggesting this possibility. An authoritarian ruler that chose the second 
path to constitutional change would have to take the possibility of international condemnation 
and possible sanctions into account in doing so. 
150 David Landau, Abusive Constitutionalism, UC. DAVIS L. REV. (forthcoming 2013). 
151 One might include “abusive constitutionalism” as a separate category in a pluralized account 
of constitutionalism, because it occurs when autocratic political leaders comply with the 
constitution’s express terms. I have not done so here mainly for expository reasons. 
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Abusive constitutionalism has several features. First, it involves the use of 
constitutionally permissible methods to modify an existing constitution.152 Second, it involves 
the adoption of numerous amendments to the existing constitution. Third, taken individually the 
amendments may not be inconsistent with normative constitutionalism.153  But, finally, 
considered as a package, the amendments threaten normative constitutionalism.154  
 (a) Hungary. Hungary’s post-communist government operated under a constitution 
adopted in 1949, but amended substantially in 1989-90 and 1995.155 To ensure that the one-
                                                 
152 The phrase “constitutionally permissible” conceals a small problem. Sometimes abusive 
constitutionalism employs the mechanisms for amendment embodied the existing constitution. 
Sometimes it deploys the constituent power directly, but in a non-violent way.  
153 For example, an amendment that expressly deprived a despised minority of its right to vote 
would not be an example of abusive constitutionalism as I define it.  
154 This is so for at least two reasons. (1) The new provisions give the political party introducing 
them an immediate political advantage, given the existing political context, even though one or 
another might be a simple “good government” reform in other political circumstances. (2) 
Inserting a single amendment into a constitution occurs without creating troubling or 
destabilizing interactions with other provisions, whereas introducing numerous amendments 
might create such interactions. 
155 My account draws heavily on Miklós Bánkuti, Gábor Halmai & Kim Lane Scheppele, 
Disabling the Constitution, 23 J. DEMOCRACY 138 (2012). András Jakab & Pál Sonnevend, 
Continuity with Deficiencies: The New Basic Law of Hungary, 9 EUR. CONST’L L. REV.  102 
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house parliament would support a stable government, the amended constitution gave bonus seats 
to larger parties, thereby reducing the probability that a winning party would have to form a 
potentially unstable coalition with smaller parties. In addition, the constitution had a simple 
amendment rule – two-thirds of a single parliament could amend any provision of the 
constitution, although a four-fifths majority was required to “set the rules for writing a new 
constitution.”156 
 In April 2010 the conservative party Fidesz, led by Viktor Orbán, won parliamentary 
elections with 53% of the popular vote. The “bonus” system gave them 68% of the seats in 
parliament. Fidesz used its supermajority to amend the constitution quite substantially. The 
provision requiring a four-fifths majority to rewrite the constitution was an “ordinary” provision, 
amendable by the ordinary two-thirds majority. The Fidesz parliament amended the four-fifths 
provision to authorize rewriting the constitution according to rules set by a two-thirds majority. It 
changed the method for selecting judges on the Constitutional Court from one that required 
cross-party agreement on judicial nominations to one allowing two-thirds of the parliament to 
nominate and appoint judges, and then restricted the Constitutional Court’s jurisdiction over 
fiscal matters and questions about the allocation of authority between the executive and 
parliament, although it preserved the Court’s jurisdiction over many individual-rights claims. 
The parliament expanded the Constitutional Court’s membership, which had the effect of 
allowing Fidesz to name a majority of the Court’s members. In addition, the parliament 
                                                                                                                                                             
(2013), provide an account that gives more detail about the constitutional revisions and offer a 
more tempered account of the revisions’ political implications. 
156 Bankuti, Halmai & Scheppele, note --- supra, at 139. 
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restructured the institutions charged with regulating elections and the media. By altering the 
membership rules of the Electoral Commission, the Fidesz parliament was able to gain control of 
the Commission. It gave the Media Council, staffed by Fidesz members, expanded regulatory 
powers over the press media, though not the internet and social media.157 Finally, the parliament 
extended the terms of office of some of the occupants of “watchdog” positions to last beyond the 
next scheduled election and filled those offices with Fidesz members. These included the 
national audit office, the public prosecutor, and the office charged with regulating the ordinary 
courts and supervising judicial nominations for those courts.158 
 These constitutional changes altered the form of Hungary’s constitutionalism from 
standard liberal constitutionalism to something with the potential for becoming authoritarian 
constitutionalism and, beyond that, pure authoritarianism. As Bánkuti, Halmai, and Scheppele 
put it: 
                                                 
157 The Constitutional Court held that the expanded powers could not be used in connection with 
traditional print media. Id. at 141. 
158 The government “walked back” some of the initial amendments. For example, it rescinded an 
amendment that would allow the term of the head of the national judicial office to be extended 
beyond its scheduled expiration if parliament is unable to agree on a replacement by a two-thirds 
majority. The initial amendment, Act CLXI of 2011 on the Organization and Administration of 
Courts of Hungary was amended in July 2012 to establish a “line of succession” if the position of 
head of the national judicial office became vacant as the result of the expiration of the head’s 
term. 
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Assuming that there continue to be free and fair elections among competing parties in the 
future, it will be hard for any other party to come to power with this level of political 
control over all the institutions necessary for democratic elections. Even if another party 
defies the odds and manages to win an election, however, Fidesz and its loyalists are 
entrenched in every corner of the state … These loyalists ensure that there will be 
multiple choke-points at which Fidesz can stop anything that deviates from its 
preferences.159 
Importantly for present purposes, all these changes occurred within the existing constitutional 
framework: Fidesz and its leaders followed all the rules set out in the preexisting contitution and 
were able to plant the seeds of authoritarian constitutionalism.160 
(b) Venezuela. Hugo Chávez was elected president of Venezuela in 1998. Over the next 
decade he transformed a competitive democratic system into something else – perhaps not an 
authoritarian constitutionalist one, but certainly a hybrid one.161 Shortly after taking office 
Chávez set in motion a procedure for constitutional amendment by setting up a “consultative 
referendum” that would elect delegates to a constituent assembly. The Venezuelan constitution 
                                                 
159 Bánkuti, Halmai & Scheppele, supra note ---, at 145. 
160 For developments in 2013, see Gábor Halmai, The End of Liberal Constitutionalism in 
Hungary?, Int’l J. Const. L. Blog, April 17, 2013, available 
at: http://www.iconnectblog.com/2013/04/the-end-of-liberal-constitutionalism-in-hungary. 
161 The term hybrid is used in JAVIER CORRALES & MICHAEL PENFOLD, DRAGON IN THE TROPICS: 
HUGO CHÁVEZ AND THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF REVOLUTION IN VENEZUELA (2011). The 
account that follows draws on id. at 18-40. 
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authorized the nation’s legislature to amend the constitution or to call a constituent assembly by 
a two-thirds vote. A year before Chávez’s election, though, his predecessor had used a 
consultative referendum, so Chávez’s action had some precedent. The legislature challenged 
Chávez’s plan, but in 1999 the Venezuelan Supreme Court held that the referendum process did 
not violate the constitution, invoking the idea that the nation’s people, acting as the constituent 
power could not be constrained by preexisting law about the processes for constitutional 
revision.162 Held in April 1999, the referendum resulted in an 87% vote in favor of convening a 
constituent assembly. Again with the approval of the Supreme Court, ordinary legislative 
sessions were suspended while the constituent assembly met. The election rules for the 
constituent assembly favored the well-organized Chavista party over opposition parties, which 
put up multiple candidates in each constituency. As a result, Chávez’s party held 93% of the 
seats in the constituent assembly despite having won only 53% of the votes. The constitution 
drafted in 1999 substantially expanded presidential power. The president’s term was lengthened 
by one year, and reelection to a second term was allowed, and the legislature’s upper house was 
abolished. Importantly, transitional provisions gave substantial authority to a council dominated 
                                                 
162 For a detailed discussion of the legal issues, see ALLAN R. BREWER-CARÍAS, DISMANTLING 
DEMOCRACY IN VENEZUELA: THE CHÁVEZ AUTHORITARIAN EXPERIMENT (2010). (Brewer-Carías 
does not discuss his role, the precise contours of which are contested, in an abortive coup against 
Chávez in 2002.) See also Landau, supra note ---, at [draft pp. 16-23]. The theoretical issues 
associated with the idea of the constituent power are quite complex, and exploring them would 
take this discussion too far afield. For some brief reflections, see Mark Tushnet, Constitution-
Making: An Introduction, 91 TEX. L. REV. 1983 (2013). 
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by members of the constituent assembly and other chavistas. Using that authority, the 
transitional council appointed new members to the election monitoring body. 
New elections were held in 2000. Chávez’s coalition won sixty percent of the seats in the 
now single-house legislature. The opposition mobilized substantial demonstrations, and 
attempted a coup, which failed after a few days.163 The opposition turned to strikes and similar 
mobilizations of civil society. Chávez responded by nationalizing the petroleum industry, which 
had been a major site of opposition. The opposition attempted to recall Chávez. The election 
monitoring board, which chavistas controlled because of the transitional laws, enforced rules that 
made it difficult to invoke the constitution’s recall provisions, but eventually the monitoring 
board agreed that the recall petition had enough signatures. The recall election was scheduled for 
August 2004. Chávez met the threat by a massive increase in public spending – from oil 
revenues --, distributed to the nation’s poor. Chávez defeated the recall, winning 59% of the 
vote. The opposition, disheartened, “simply collapsed.”164 Chávez’s opponents, identified 
through a computerized list, found themselves shut out of jobs, public contrasts, and other 
                                                 
163 Corrales and Penfold refer to these events as a “series of coups … Chávez’s coup against 
institutions of checks and balances, the military coup against Chávez, Carmona’s coup against 
the constitution and elected officials, and the civil-military coup against Carmona,” id. at 22, but 
I think it important that Chávez’s actions, while perhaps an example of abusive 
constitutionalism, were consistent with the constitutions in place at the time. Notably, his initial 
moves were approved by a Supreme Court whose members predated Chávez’s accession to the 
presidency.  
164 Id. at 27. 
71 
 
“social benefits.”165 Legislative elections were held in December 2005.  The opposition 
boycotted the elections, so chavistas took complete control over the legislative process. 
The next presidential election took place in 2006. The opposition objected to various 
features of the election rules, and the government responded with what two analysts critical of 
Chávez call “partial reforms,” including election monitoring. Corrales and Penhold note that the 
election monitors did not find “evidence of rigged voter registration, but they did confirm that 
the system did not fully protect against voting by unregistered voters.”166 They note as well that 
the government removed fingerprint machines from some polling places but kept them in poorer 
communities, where Chávez’s support was highest. According to Corrales and Penhold, “The 
opposition claimed that by keeping fingerprint machines in these key polls, the government was 
deviously playing a ‘psychological’ game: encouraging people to question the secrecy of the 
vote, which would boost abstention rates among opposition voters.”167 Chávez won the election, 
which the opposition conceded to be basically free of fraud, with 63 percent of the vote, “the 
widest margin and highest voter turnout in Venezuelan history.”168 Having achieved power, 
Chávez consolidated it through a number of statutes and decrees that further centralized power in 
the presidency. But, notably, Chávez’s call for constitutional amendments further enhancing 
presidential power, including an elimination of term limits, failed in a referendum held in 
                                                 
165 Ibid. 
166 Id. at 30. 
167 Id. at 30-31. 
168 Id. at 32. 
72 
 
December 2007. Persistent, Chávez held another referendum in February 2009, confined to the 
term-limits issue. The amendment was approved by 55 percent. 
The Venezuelan case resembles the Hungarian one: Authoritarian rules were put in place 
through methods that complied with the existing, liberal constitution. Corrales and Penhold call 
some of Chávez’s early actions a “coup,” but the term is merely metaphorical. The actions they 
describe may have been anti-constitutional in intent and in the goals they sought, but they were 
all consistent with the constitution in place. 
(c) Conclusion. The examples of abusive constitutionalism in Hungary and Venezuela are 
somewhat different from authoritarian constitutionalism as practiced in Singapore. The PAP 
could disable the opposition by grossly manipulating constitutional rules, but has not done so 
with nearly the vigor we can see in Hungary and Venezuela. I speculate that the difference is that 
the political leadership in Hungary and Venezuela were not committed to the idea of 
constitutionalism as a constraint on power, and so were willing to use constitutional forms to 
achieve anti-constitutional goals, whereas the PAP’s leadership is committed to a recognizable 
form of constitutionalism. If so, the normative commitment to constraints on public power, 
which I extracted from my description of how constitutionalism operates in Singapore, might be 
a truly distinguishing characteristic of authoritarian constitutionalism.  
(2) Constitutionalism in Authoritarian Regimes: The “Dual State.” A more general 
account of instrumental uses of constitutional forms comes in the suggestion that courts in 
authoritarian systems can be an important component in what Ernst Fraenkel called a “dual 
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state.”169 As the term suggests, dual states have two components. In one democracy reigns and 
independent courts administer law just as they do in liberal democracies. In the other arbitrary 
rule prevails. Fraenkel’s example was Nazi Germany, and Jens Meierhenrich applied the concept 
to apartheid South Africa. The key to maintaining a dual state is defining the line that divides its 
two components. Nazi Germany and apartheid South Africa did so on the basis of ascriptive 
characteristics (religion and race respectively), a definition that might seem easy to administer.170  
But, nothing in the concept of the dual state requires that the defining characteristic be ascriptive. 
So, for example, Fraenkel argued that the “arbitrary” state in Nazi Germany administered law on 
matters that were politically sensitive. 
Commentators on Singapore’s political development have invoked ideas that resemble 
the dual-state concept. They have argued that the Singaporean government offered the rule of 
law to foreign investors, for example, while maintaining a system of relatively arbitrary rule 
domestically.171 In the early 2000s Singapore’s political leadership began to focus on attracting 
                                                 
169 For an extensive discussion of Fraenkel’s analysis and an application to apartheid South 
Africa, see JENS MEIERHENREICH, THE LEGACIES OF LAW: LONG-RUN CONSEQUENCES OF LEGAL 
DEVELOPMENT IN SOUTH AFRICA, 1652-2000 (2008). For a briefer, more general description of 
“dual state” ideas, see Guarnieri, supra note ---, at 238-39. 
170 PIERRE VAN DEN BERGHE, RACE AND RACISM: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 18 (1981), uses 
the useful term “Herrenvolk democracy” to describe “regimes … that are democratic for the 
master race but tyrannical for the subordinate groups.” 
171 See, e.g., Sim, supra note ---, at 321-22 (referring expressly to the dual-state idea and 
asserting in connection with Singapore, “The law is … bifurcated, insofar as commercial law 
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the “creative” class to the city-state, a cosmopolitan group that would drive innovation forward 
but the members of which wanted relatively high degrees of freedom for themselves.172 Again, a 
dual state – civil liberties for the cosmopolitans, arbitrary rule for the rule – might seem 
workable.173 
                                                                                                                                                             
remains depoliticized and paramount to encourage investment, facilitated through strong legal 
institutions, yet there is no expansion of rights in the public sphere.”); Thio, supra note ---, at 7 
(“a dichotomous or ‘schizophrenic’ approach towards the role of law and legal institutions 
appears to be maintained between commercial law matters and issue srelating to social justice, 
civil society, and individual rights.”). 
172 Kenneth Paul Tan, “Censorship in Whose Name”,” in RENAISSANCE SINGAPORE?, supra note 
---, at 76 (observing that Singapore’s “new economy” is based on creativity). 
173 The “cosmopolitan” version of the dual state faces a special problem: Cosmopolitans might 
value not merely their own freedom but the freedom of those in the nation where they are 
located. One might develop a suggestive but controversial contrast between the interest of 
cosmopolitans in sexual freedom, which might perhaps be satisfied by ensuring that 
cosmopolitans but no one else have sexual freedom, with their interest in freedom of expression, 
which they might wish extended to all. (The point of the example is not to identify actual 
interests of cosmopolitans, but to indicate a theoretical possibility; the reverse might be true as 
well – cosmopolitans interested in sexual freedom for all, but interested in freedom of expression 
only for themselves.) The dual state might be maintained even with respect to freedom of 
expression if the state is able somehow to keep the cosmopolitans ignorant of the conditions 
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What we might call the Niemöller problem poses the primary difficulty for maintaining a 
dual state.174 The line dividing the non-arbitrary state from the arbitrary one has to be drawn by 
the very people who administer both the arbitrary and the non-arbitrary state, and they can 
provide no guarantees that in doing so they will act pursuant to the rule of law rather than 
arbitrarily.175 As a result, people whose actions are currently allocated to the regular or 
independent judicial system should not be confident that when the time comes to appear before a 
court, they will in fact be brought into that system.176 And, once again reasoning backward, 
people should generally assume that their actions might come within the jurisdiction of the 
political system. The regime then loses the strategic benefits it sought from the dual state.  
                                                                                                                                                             
elsewhere in the nation. For a brief discussion of these points, see Mark Tushnet, The Inevitable 
Globalization of Constitutional Law, 49 VA. J. INT’L L. 985, 997-98 (2009). 
174 I refer here to the famous statement by Pastor Martin Niemöller, “First they came for the 
communists, and I didn’t speak out because I wasn’t a communist…. Then they came for me, 
and there was no one left to speak for me.” The statement exists in various versions. 
175 As the core examples of Nazi Germany and apartheid South Africa indicate, even lines drawn 
on the basis of ascriptive characteristics can move arbitrarily, as shown by the Nuremberg laws 
defining the category “Jew” and the existence of the category “coloured” respectively. 
176 Cf. Frank, note --- supra, at 98 (noting that “the [Singapore] government’s willingness to 
compromise the independence of judges and lawyers cannot be limited to political cases. A 
judiciary which by its very structure lacks the requisite independence from the government … 
retain[s] th[i]s characteristic[] in all cases involving the government or the governing party, not 
simply in political cases.”). 
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(3) Conclusion. I have examined several versions of strategic or instrumental accounts of 
courts and constitutionalism in authoritarian regimes. With respect to each version I have argued 
that it is hard to understand how commitments to constitutionalism could be credible in the 
strategic sense. As Gretchen Helmke and Frances Rosenbluth put it, “precisely because autocrats 
are especially well-suited to control the risks associated with judicial independence, we are left 
wondering just who is fooled by such tactics….”177  
 
D. Other Benefits of Constitutionalism to Authoritarian Rulers 
 Authoritarian leaders can use other features of constitutionalism instrumentally. Elections 
and freedom of expression can reveal information about popular discontent with regime policies 
and, especially, their implementation. As long as that information does not show such deep 
levels of discontent as to threaten the regime’s stability, the leaders can use the information to 
modify policies that are not central to the regime and, again especially, to monitor the 
performance of the personnel charged with implementing policy. Elections can also serve as a 
cooptation device, channeling potential regime-threatening opposition onto less threatening 
paths.178 
 (1) Elections and freedom of expression as information-revealing devices, and some 
alternatives. The PAP’s reaction to the results of the 2011 elections shows how authoritarian 
                                                 
177 Gretchen Helmke & Frances Rosenbluth, Regimes and the Rule of Law: Judicial 
Independence in Comparative Perspective, 12 ANN. REV. POLIT. SCI. 345, 358 (2009). 
178 For an overview of the functions elections serve for authoritarian rulers, see Jennifer Gandhi 
& Ellen Lust-Okar, Elections Under Authoritarianism, 2009 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 403, 404-06. 
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leaders treat elections as mechanisms for providing them with information. They took the results 
as a signal that something had gone wrong with their policies, and pledged to adjust – although 
precisely what had gone wrong, and what adjustments were foreseen, remained unclear.  
 Elections have their limits as information-revealing devices. They often provide 
relatively crude indications of popular discontent. The PAP’s leaders could take their electoral 
“defeat” as an indication that they had been doing something wrong, but the results alone could 
not tell them exactly what that was. Opposition party platforms, and even campaign strategies, 
may be so comprehensive that drawing specific inferences from popular support of those 
platforms and strategies would be hazardous. 
 Perhaps more important, elections are self-limiting as information revealing devices in 
authoritarian regimes. Opposition parties that move outside the range of criticism the regime 
finds tolerable – that argue for the complete replacement of the regime, for example, or that 
stress the deep corruption of the regime’s leaders – may find themselves facing severe 
repression. Anticipating that possibility, opposition leaders will pull their punches, taking care 
not to exceed the limits of criticism the regime will tolerate. When they do so, though, they 
inevitably deny the regime some information about failures of policy and implementation that 
are not regime-threatening.179 
                                                 
179 Cf. Edmund Malesky, Paul Schuler & Anh Tran, The Adverse Effects of Sunshine: A Field 
Experiment on Legislative Transparency in an Authoritarian Assembly, 106 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 
762 (2012) (reporting that an experiment making more transparent the actions taken by 
legislators in Vietnam’s national assembly reduced the legislators’ level of activity, and arguing 
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 Authoritarian regimes can use techniques other than reasonably free and fair elections to 
obtain information about popular views of policy and its implementation. In Russia, for example, 
the regime has created complaint bureaus – “public reception offices” – that receive complaints 
on those issues.180 The bureaus are located outside the ordinary administrative hierarchy, because 
leaders understand that personnel “on the ground” may be reluctant to report adverse information 
about popular views on regime policies and will surely be reluctant to report to their superiors 
their own deficiencies as implementers of policy. The complaint bureaus, like ombuds offices in 
liberal democracies, bypass line officials to channel information from lower levels to central 
administrators.181 From an instrumental point of view, the choice between these techniques and 
reasonably free and fair elections should be determined by the comparative costs of each. And, 
because holding reasonably free and fair elections poses some risks to the regime, I suspect that 
the alternative techniques are generally likely to be less costly than holding such elections. 
                                                                                                                                                             
that it did so because transparency reduced the legislators’ willingness to bring to the attention of 
the regime’s leaders information that might destabilize the regime). 
180 For a description of the complaint bureaus, see WILLIAM J. DOBSON, THE DICTATOR’S 
LEARNING CURVE: INSIDE THE GLOBAL BATTLE FOR DEMOCRACY 22-23 (2012) (observing that 
the complaint bureaus “provide a direct line of communication for citizens to air their problems, 
grievances, and complaints to the central government.”). See also id. at 23-24 (describing the 
Russian “Public Chamber,” with a similar function). 
181 See also LYDGATE, supra note ---, at 96-97 (describing Citizens’ Consultative Committees 
and Residents’ Committee in Singapore that serve as complaint bureaus). 
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Scholars have suggested that courts can serve similar information-revealing functions, 
especially in connection with policy implementation. As Carlo Guarnieri puts it, “national rulers 
are willing to employ courts as a check on local political bosses; the central government will try 
to establish some channels of influence with lower courts judges, but it will allow some degree 
of independence of courts from local politics.”182 Authoritarian regimes, though, must then 
worry about the possibility that the lower-level bureaucrats and the local courts might corrupt 
each other through what some scholars of Communist China call local protectionism.183 The 
remedies are some form of centralization – divorcing the local judicial budget from local revenue 
sources,184 for example, or creating a readily available mechanism of appeal to some regional or 
central body. 
                                                 
182 Guarnieri, supra note ---, at 240. See also Tom Ginsburg, “Judicial Independence in East 
Asia: Some Lessons for China,” in JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN CHINA, supra note ---, at 249 (“A 
limited regime of complaints by the public can shine the light on bureaucratic malfeasance, 
informing the regime center and improving the quality of government.”). Cf. Randall 
Peerenboom, “Judicial Independence in China: Common Myths and Unfounded Assumptions,” 
in JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN CHINA, supra note ---, at 81 (describing practices in China that 
involve directives from central Communist Party institutions seeking reports from local courts on 
individual cases). 
183 See Peerenboom, supra note ---, at 82-83; Yu Xingzhong, supra note ---, at 90-91 (discussing 
local protectionism). 
184 See id. at 83 (observing that the regime in China “has opted for both approaches, … 
recommending that the central and provincial levels be responsible for funding the courts.”). 
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 Guaranteeing some degree of freedom of expression clearly has similar information-
revealing characteristics. Here the only point worth making is that such guarantees are 
necessarily self-limiting in an authoritarian regime. As with opposition parties, so ordinary 
citizens know that the regime sets limits on what sorts of expression it will tolerate, and citizens 
will therefore steer wide of the “unlawful” zone185 – and thereby will provide the regime less 
information than it actually would find useful. As William Alford observes about “rice-roots 
lawyers” in China, who provide legal services in rural areas, “The very qualities … that are a 
part of the allure of rice-roots legal workers for rural Chinese also potentially represent an 
impediment to these workers serving the same clientele as effectively as they might, lest in 
vigorously challenging officialdom, rice-roots legal workers jeopardize their own long-term 
relationship with the powerful.”186 This self-limiting dynamic applies far more generally. 
 Some of the arguments about elections and free expression as information-revealing 
devices rely rather heavily on difficulties officials at the center – the regime’s leaders – face in 
acquiring accurate information about policy and its implementation on the periphery. These are 
clearly difficulties of scale, and it may therefore be worth noting that they might not arise in a 
city-state like Singapore, where the distinction between center and periphery is almost 
vanishingly thin. The PAP’s leaders can and do visit the city’s neighborhoods without any 
                                                 
185 I take the phrase from Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958), and the U.S. law of 
overbreadth. 
186 William P. Alford, “‘Second lawyers, first principles’: lawyers, rice-roots legal workers, and 
the battle over legal professionalism in China,” in PROSPECTS FOR THE PROFESSIONS IN CHINA 48 
(William D. Alford, Kenneth Winston & William C. Kirby eds., 2011), at 62. 
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logistical difficulties, and they can receive complaints about neighborhood problems directly. 
This suggests that Singapore’s commitment to reasonably free and fair elections, which I include 
as part of its authoritarian constitutionalism, rests on something other than elections’ utility as an 
information-revealing technique. 
 (2) Elections as cooptation. Authoritarian regimes are sometimes said to use elections as 
devices to co-opt or domesticate opposition. One aspect of cooptation is that the regime provides 
outlets for oppositionist impulses to let off steam without affecting policy by tolerating 
opposition parties that are consigned to ineffectiveness. Here the puzzle is explaining why the 
opposition leaders allow themselves to be bought off in this way.187 Another aspect is that 
“[e]lections allow leaders to identify the most popular local notables or potential opposition 
forces” and then “placate [them] by giving them some say over policymaking….”188 Cooptation 
is effective because it “takes place in a more stable, institutionalized environment than would be 
the case in an informal … arrangement,” and “disagreements … can be presented in a controlled 
                                                 
187 Cf. Ellen Lust-Okar, Elections Under Authoritarianism: Preliminary Lessons from Jordan, 13 
DEMOCRATIZATION 456, 460 (2006) (“the logic underlying … [arguments that ‘election in 
authoritarian regimes add legitimacy to the regime’] is not convincing. It suggests that 
individuals are somehow led to believe … that their elections … give them more input into 
decision-making than they do.”). I put aside the possibility of straightforward corruption: The 
regime gives opposition leaders material benefits for participating, thereby deterring them from 
engaging in more vigorous opposition efforts. 
188 Malesky et. al., supra note ---, at 765. 
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and unthreatening manner that will not generate larger protests.”189 Yet, why the coopted 
participants would indeed be placated is not entirely clear. Perhaps the regime throws them some 
scraps on minor policy issues, and the opposition leaders believe that something is better than the 
nothing the regime might do were they not to participate in elections with effectively 
predetermined outcomes.190 Yet, a sophisticated regime could make the minor policy changes on 
its own, without using elections as a cooptation device, so it remains unclear why authoritarian 
regimes would use elections for these purposes.191 
 Again, other institutional mechanisms can substitute for elections as cooptation devices.  
                                                 
189 Id. at 766. 
190 Leaders of Singapore’s main opposition party regularly complain about the limited role they 
have in Parliament, but, while expressly their discontent, have regularly accepted appointments 
as NCMPs. [citation] 
191 Carles Boix & Milan Slovik, “Non-Tyrannical Autocracies (unpublished ms., April 2007), 
argue that the regime needs to identify the local notables because the latter have some degree 
over control over their (local) populations, and maintain it by delivering desired policies to those 
populations. Yet, in that case, the regime could deliver the policies directly to the population, 
cutting out the middleman. It seems to me that this account would then become one in which 
elections serve as information revealing devises. 
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The PAP leadership in Singapore institutionalized cooptation by creating positions for opposition 
party members and elites outside the PAP. The NCMP and NMP system places the holders of 
those on the border between co-optation by election and pure co-optation.192  
 (3) Elections as intimidation. Elections can reveal information about the regime as well 
as provide information to it.193  A regime that wins a reasonably free and fair election by a wide 
margin can by that very fact discourage opposition. Opponents might think that a narrow margin 
of victory might have resulted from chance, or from having put up a slightly inferior candidate. 
But, they might worry, how much effort is it worth to try to shift the electoral margin from 80% 
against them to 65% against them? 
 Singapore’s 2011 election suggests one difficulty with this strategy, from the 
authoritarian regime’s point of view. Having set expectations for a huge margin of victory, 60% 
apparently seemed “narrow” to participants in Singapore’s political circles.194 The alternative, of 
course, is to abandon the commitment to reasonably free and fair elections when electoral 
margins fall below some reasonably high level. At that point elections no longer intimidate the 
                                                 
192 As with reasonably free and fair elections as information-revealing devices, here too the 
choice of such elections or alternative methods of cooptation should, from an instrumental point 
of view, be determined by relative costs. 
193 See ALBERTO SIMPSER, WHY GOVERNMENTS AND PARTIES MANIPULATE ELECTIONS: THEORY, 
PRACTICE, AND IMPLICATIONS (2103) (developing a more general version of this account, 
including manipulations that exceed the limits of reasonably free and fair elections).  
194 In the 1990s political lore in Singapore had it that an election in which the PAP received less 
than 80% of the vote would be a disaster for the party. 
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opposition, but forceful intimidation does. The fact that Singapore appears to be committed to 
continuing to conduct reasonably free and fair elections provides one reason for thinking that it 
offers an example of authoritarian constitutionalism rather than pure authoritarianism. 
 
E. Two Qualifications 
The argument to this point has been that strategic or instrumental accounts of courts and 
constitutionalism in authoritarian regimes generally fail because of the problem of unraveling. 
That problem might not arise in two circumstances: transitional periods and when the experience 
of constitutionalism, initially adopted for strategic reasons, sets in train a dynamic process that 
escapes the regime’s control. 
(1) Transitional Periods. The literature on courts and constitutions in authoritarian 
societies tends to focus on two time periods. First, it is argued, creating a constitution 
immediately after an authoritarian regime is established allows the new rulers to deprive their 
adversaries of any legal basis for asserting power and, probably more important, allows the new 
rulers to establish a framework allocating power among themselves.195 
                                                 
195 ROBERT BARROS, CONSTITUTIONALISM AND DICTATORSHIP (2002); Micahel Albertus & 
Victor Menaldo, Dictators as Founding Fathers, 24  ECON. & POL. 279 (2012). I would think that 
the new constitutional framework would ratify the informal allocation of power within the new 
ruling group, and indeed sometimes the literature seems to me to blur the distinction between a 
written constitution and unwritten constitutions. Here the puzzle is then why the formal 
allocation of power might continue to have some constraining effect when the actual power 
relationships change. So, for example, consider a military junta in which the Army, Air Force, 
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 The other period on which the literature focuses is the time when the authoritarian regime 
is, or is thought by some to be, in irreversible decline.196 During this period strategic accounts of 
judicial review in particular are indeed persuasive. Judges in place, anticipating regime change, 
attempt to figure out what actions will maximize their chances of staying in office through and 
after the transition. Sometimes, perhaps often, those actions will lead the judges to take stands 
against the rulers-in-place, who, the judges think, may not be in place much longer. 
 Strategic accounts may have some purchase quite early in an authoritarian regime’s 
history, and more purchase when the regime has jumped the shark. What they do not provide, 
though, is an account of authoritarian constitutionalism in stable authoritarian regimes.197 
                                                                                                                                                             
and Navy chiefs of staff take power and establish a constitution requiring the agreement of two 
of the three to adopt any policy. Suppose that, within a few years, it becomes apparent that the 
Navy chief of staff simply lacks sufficient support from the relevant constituencies (“sailors,” 
say) to have any real power. Why won’t the Army and Air Force chiefs amend the constitution to 
eliminate the Navy from the junta? (One might think that the Army’s leaders would prefer to 
maintain the requirement of Navy agreement, to preserve the possibility that they might form a 
coalition with the Navy against the Air Force. Yet, doing so also preserves the possibility that the 
Navy would form a coalition with the Air Force against the Army. There may be conditions 
under which the latter risk is worth bearing, compared to the possibility of engaging in a direct 
power struggle with the Air Force, but I am skeptical about their actual existence.) 
196 citations 
197 In my view, the literature on stable authoritarian regimes locates a great deal of the stability in 
authoritarian repression, often violent, and fraudulent elections. (Or, at least, reverts to repression 
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 (2) Dynamic Changes. Authoritarian rulers might place constitutional constraints on 
themselves and create enforcement institutions for strategic reasons, believing that they can 
remove the constraints or restructure the institutions if their preferences change. But, they might 
find that they have unleashed a dynamic in which the constraints and institutions interact in 
unexpected ways, creating a dynamic that pushes toward the creation of liberal democracy or a 
stabilized restructured regime of a sort that I describe as authoritarian constitutionalist.198 Bruce 
Rutherford sketches one possible sequence: the regime is weakened by some sort of exogenous 
crisis; “regime elites try to preserve their power … by adopting political, legal, and economic 
reforms” that “create opportunities for competing conceptions of the polity to emerge and grow”; 
“[i]institutions that espouse alternative conceptions … exploit these opportunities” and the 
regime “permits this process to proceed either because it is unable to stop it, or because the 
reforms it produces provide benefits to the regime”; and the result is a regime in which “multiple 
                                                                                                                                                             
and electoral fraud as the ultimate foundation of authoritarian stability.) If there is such a thing as 
authoritarian constitutionalism, it is not going to have either of those features. 
198 ALBERT BEEBE WHITE, SELF-GOVERNMENT AT THE KING’S COMMAND: A STUDY IN THE 
BEGINNINGS OF ENGLISH DEMOCRACY (1933), describes how English kings used the people 
generally to monitor the behavior of local officials, with the result that the kings, having “so used 
the English people in government, [and having] laid upon them for centuries such burdens and 
responsibilities,… went far toward creating the Englishman’s governmental sense and 
competence….” Id. at 2 (summarizing the book’s argument). For a discussion of the use of 
courts and others institutions in authoritarian societies to monitor official behavior, see TAN --- 
supra. 
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conceptions of the polity” offered by political entrepreneurs compete in a process of 
“cooperation, conflict, and innovation” that can preserve the (new) order’s stability.199 The 
literature suggests, though without spelling out the mechanisms in detail, that this is especially 
likely where one of the institutional reforms involves the (initially limited) empowerment of civil 
society.200 So, for example, perhaps the creation of constitutional courts brings into being a new 
constituency of activist lawyers who specialize in constitutional litigation. This new interest 
alters the internal dynamics of interest-group pressure, and may be particularly effective in 
opposing withdrawal of jurisdiction from the constitutional courts. The empirical evidence for 
such a dynamic is, in my judgment, thin and speculatively based on pushing anecdotes to their 
limits.201  
 
F. Conclusion 
 As noted in the Introduction, the preceding Part has been deflationary. I have argued that 
strategic or instrumental accounts of the adoption of constitutionalism in authoritarian regimes 
are generally flawed. That does not mean, of course, that authoritarian regimes are 
constitutionalist. It does suggest, though, that if we observe persistent constitutionalist features in 
                                                 
199 BRUCE K. RUTHERFORD, EGYPT AFTER MUBARAK: LIBERALISM, ISLAM, AND DEMOCRACY IN 
THE ARAB WORLD 27-28 (2008). 
200 For additional discussion, see text accompanying notes --- infra (discussing the role of civil 
society in providing information to authoritarian rulers). 
201 The primary anecdote involves the Lawyers’ Movement in Pakistan. For a discussion, see, 
citation to Law and Social Inquiry article. 
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authoritarian regimes, we might conclude that those features serve the regime’s goals, but those 
goals might not be “merely” instrumental. Perhaps, for example, the authoritarian ruler has a 
normative commitment to advancing the nation’s honor, and concludes that constitutionalism 
will help do so. Or, perhaps, these authoritarian rulers have a direct normative commitment to 
some degree of constitutionalism.202 In the latter case, authoritarian constitutionalism would then 
be part of the pluralized universe of constitutionalism. 
 
V. Authoritarian Constitutionalism 
How can authoritarian constitutionalism be distinguished from (mere) authoritarianism 
and rule-of-law constitutionalism? For present purposes, constitutionalism is normatively 
weighted, not necessarily applicable to all states that have written constitutions, even written 
constitutions setting out institutional arrangements and individual rights. The 1936 Constitution 
of the Soviet Union had such a constitution, but the Soviet Union was fully authoritarian. I take 
as a rough definition of authoritarianism that all decisions can potentially be made by a single 
decision-maker,203 whose decisions are both formally and practically unregulated by law, though 
as students of authoritarian constitutions have emphasized, they might be regulated by conflicts 
                                                 
202 Formally, the argument in the text is that we should take the rulers’ utility functions to include 
both their own material well-being and something else, such as advancing national honor or 
respecting constitutionalism. 
203  Which might be a collective body, such as the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist 
Party. He and Warren use the term “command authoritarianism.” He & Warren, supra note ---, at 
273. 
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of power,204 even rather structured and predictable conflicts.205 Constitutionalists differ on the 
content of normative constitutionalism, and I do not intend to take a position on anything other 
than what its broad boundaries are.  
 
 A. Some Characteristics of Authoritarian Constitutional Regimes 
My discussion of the role of courts and constitutions in authoritarian regimes suggests 
some of the characteristics of authoritarian constitutional ones, which I sketch next. 
(1) The regime, which for expository convenience I will assume is controlled by a 
dominant party, makes all relevant public policy decisions, and there is no basis in law for 
challenging whatever choices the regime makes. This is what makes the regime authoritarian. 
(2) The regime does not arrest political opponents arbitrarily, although it may impose a 
variety of sanctions on them, such as the risk of bankruptcy from libel judgments in Singapore.  
                                                 
204 This definition implies that political constitutionalism, as discussed in the British literature, 
must describe politics as more than a mere power struggle, the precipitate of which yields 
normative constitutionalism, but as implicating in politics itself arguments about law. 
205 It is probably worth noting that an authoritarian regime might choose to implement normative 
constitutionalism, on the condition that it remain free to replace it at any time. As one Chinese 
informant put it to me, “The People’s Republic of China could have a real constitution whenever 
the Central Committee of the Communist Party wanted it – and for as long as the Central 
committee wanted it.” The regime would have to consider the possibility that doing so would 
unleash the dynamic process discussed in Part --- supra.. 
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(3) Even as it employs such sanctions, the regime allows reasonably open discussion and 
criticism of its policies. The regime’s critics find themselves able to disseminate their criticisms 
even after they have been sanctioned. The Singaporean libel judgments impoverish the 
government’s critics, but they still have access to resources through friends and family who are 
not themselves active critics of the government (and therefore cannot be sanctioned because of 
the limitations rule-of-law constitutionalism places on the regime).206  
(4) The regime operates reasonably free and fair elections, with close attention to such 
matters as the drawing of election districts and the creation of party lists to ensure as best it can 
that it will prevail – and by a substantial margin – in such elections. Fraud and physical 
intimidation occur, if at all, only sporadically and unsystematically. As Carlos Casteneda put it, 
referring to Mexico, the dominant party was “no ‘tea party’” but “‘[r]epression was truly a last 
resort.’”207 Levitsky and Way describe competitive authoritarianism as combining both 
occasional “high-intensity coercion” and more routine “low-intensity coercion.” The latter 
                                                 
206 For a description of how Jeyaretnam conducted his life after bankruptcy, see Obituary, 
“Joshua B. Jeyaretnam: Singapore Opposition Leader,” Oct. 1, 2008, Times Online, available at 
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/comment/obituaries/article4855720.ece (visited Sept. 28, 
2011). See also HARDING, supra note ---, at 99 (describing the detention of a Malaysian 
opposition leader who continued to be “an effective and indefatigable Leader of the 
Opposition.”). 
207 Quoted in BEATRIZ MAGALONI, VOTING FOR AUTOCRACY: HEGEMONIC PARTY SURVIVAL AND 
ITS DEMISE IN MEXICO 10-11 (2006). The reference is to the famous statement by Mao Tse Tung, 
“Revolution is not a tea party,” not to the Tea Party movement in the United States. 
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includes “surveillance … low-profile physical harassment …, denial of employment, 
scholarships, or university entrance to opposition activists; denial of public service … to 
individuals and communities with ties to the opposition; and use of tax, regulatory, or other state 
agencies to investigate and prosecute opposition politicians, entrepreneurs, and media 
owners.”208 Authoritarian constitutional regimes lower the intensity of coercion even more, as 
with Case’s example of denying upgrades in services, not the services themselves, to districts 
where the opposition is strong. 
(5) The dominant party is sensitive to public opinion, and alters its policies at least on 
occasion in response to what it perceives to be public views. Its motivation for responsiveness 
may be mixed, though a desire to remain in power dominates other motivations such as 
judgments about what is in the nation’s best interests.  
(6) It may develop mechanisms to ensure that the amount of dissent does not exceed the 
level it regards as desirable. Magaloni focuses on the hegemonic party’s efforts to keep whatever 
dissent occurs within its ranks, by holding out the prospect of rewards not only to party loyalists 
but to party activists who challenge the party from within. “Co-optation is better than exclusion” 
because it allows the hegemonic party to achieve the massive victories it requires.209 I have 
already described some of Singapore’s mechanisms for cooptation. There are of course less 
formal methods of cooptation. For example, Singapore is said to have an extremely effective 
system of early talent-spotting, through which promising young people are noticed in the 
                                                 
208 Levitsky & Way, supra note ---, at 58. 
209 MAGALONI, supra note ---, at 16. 
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universities and channeled into government-supporting positions of power.210 These mechanisms 
of co-optation may have the collateral effect of increasing the regime’s responsiveness to public 
opinion and criticism. 
(7) Courts are reasonably independent, and enforce basic rule-of-law requirements 
reasonably well. Although judges, especially those on higher courts, are likely to be sensitive to 
the regime’s interests because of the judges’ training and the mechanisms of judicial selection 
and promotion, they rarely take direct instruction from the regime. Sometimes, indeed, they 
might reject important regime initiatives on rule-of-law or constitutional grounds. But, the 
system of constitutional review will necessarily be weak-form, with the regime having the power 
to alter the constitution so that its initiatives conform to the courts’ interpretations.211 
 
B. The Role of Ideology 
 Authoritarian leaders often articulate a comprehensive ideology they use to justify the 
unrestrained exercise of power – revolutionary Marxism, Peronism, chavismo.212 
                                                 
210 For a summary of that system, see BARR & SKRBIS, note --- supra, at 70-71. That summary is 
elaborated more completely in the remainder of the cited work. 
211 Building weak-form review into the constitution’s structure may be affirmatively desirable, 
because it openly describes the system’s actual functioning. Writing strong-form review into the 
constitution, in contrast, raises the possibility that the regime’s actions in response to judicial 
rulings will reek of hypocrisy. 
212 For a discussion of authoritarian ideologies, see 
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Constitutionalism is an ideology that justifies both the use of power and its justified restraints. 
Can authoritarianism be combined with constitutionalism into a distinctive regime ideology? 
 The so-called Asian values debate in the 1990s suggested one possibility, briefly pursued 
by Lee Kuan Yew. According to him, “In the East the main object is to have a well-ordered 
society so that everybody can have maximum enjoyment of his freedoms.”213 Individuals were 
not “pristine and separate,” but had to be seen in a wider context, first of their families, then 
“friends and the wider society.”214 Similarly, as summarized by Bruce Rutherford, some 
proponents of Islamic constitutionalism see the state “as a carefully maintained path that directs 
state power toward the transformation of individual Muslims and the creation of a more pious 
community.” Constitutionalism “ensure[s] that the state stays on this path and fully achieves its 
potential to change individuals and society.”215 
                                                 
213 Fareed Zakaria, “Culture is Destiny: A Conversation with Lee Kuan Yew,” Foreign Affairs, 
vo. 73, no. 2 (March-April 1994), pp. 109, 111. For the background of Lee Kuan Yew’s thought, 
see Michael D. Barr, Lee Kuan Yew and the “Asian Values” Debate, 24 ASIAN STUDIES REV. 
309 (2000). 
214 Id. at 113. 
215 RIUTHERFORD, supra note ---, at 126. See also Li-Ann Thio, “A Bill of Rights Without a 
‘Rights Culture’? Fundamental Liberties and Constitutional Adjudication in Singapore,” in 
COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 303, 319 (2nd ed., Mahendra P. Singh ed., 2011) 
(summarizing “the government’s preferred ‘national ideology’ as expressed in a 1992 White 
Paper as “nation before community and society above self; … regard and community support for 
the individual; … consensus instead of contention; and … racial and religious harmony.”). 
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 The Asian values debate became exhausted when participants realized that, as articulated 
by its proponents, “Asian values” were not an alternative to constitutionalism but a version of 
it,216 what one analyst called “republican communitarianism.”217 It differed from “Western” 
versions of constitutionalism only in the degree to which standard limitations on individual rights 
were used to justify government policies. So, for example, limitations clauses in the European 
Convention on Human Rights – an undeniably liberal constitutionalist document – authorize 
limitations on the right to private and family life “in the interests of national security, public 
safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the 
protection of the rights and freedoms of others,” and on the right to freedom of expression “in the 
interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder 
or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of 
others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining 
the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.”218 As formulated, if not as applied by the 
European Court on Human Rights, these phrases fit comfortably within Lee Kuan Yew’s 
articulation of “Asian values.” As Surain Subramaniam puts it, perhaps “Asian values are not 
much more than conservative western values” – values, I would stress, that are part of the 
                                                 
216 But see Rodan, supra note ---, at 242 (asserting that “the ideological utility of … Asian values 
diminished, not least because with the onset of the Asian financial crisis of 1997, the ‘Asian 
way’ became too closely associated with corruption and economic mismanagement.”). 
217 The phrase comes from Neera Badhwar, quoted in Barr, supra note ---, at 312. 
218 European Convention on Human Rights, Arts. 8 (2), 10 (2). 
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general constitutionalist tradition.219 Seen in this way, the Asian values debate is a debate within 
that tradition. 
 The ideology of authoritarian constitutionalism can be understood as lying near one end 
of a spectrum running from strong libertarianism through U.S.-style liberalism and the European 
tradition of social democracy to a constitutionalism that freely invokes standard justifications for 
restrictions on individual freedom. Importantly, though, authoritarian constitutionalism is 
constitutionalist because it invokes standard justifications, not ones flowing from a distinctive 
authoritarian ideology. 
 The Asian values debate ended with its proponents retreating from the position that there 
were distinctive Asian values ordering their versions of authoritarian constitutionalism, 
defending those versions instead on pragmatic grounds. Subramaniam offers a good summary of 
the pragmatic argument: 
(a) Western liberal democracy is only one variant, among many, of democratic systems 
of government; (b) each country has its own unique set of natural, human, and cultural 
resources, as well as historical and political experiences; (c) the mode of governance or 
the political system of a country must not only accommodate those unique features but 
also devise responses that will resonate with the members of the society …’ (d) the 
legitimacy of any political system, including democracy, must be evaluated according to 
its ability to achieve certain ends …; and (e) determining the type of political system that 
                                                 
219 Surain Subramaniam, The Asian Values Debate: Implications for the Spread of Liberal 
Democracy, 27 ASIAN AFFAIRS 19, 24 (----) 
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is to be adopted in a particular society involves finding “the best social and political 
arrangements by means of a pragmatic and continuous process of experimentation.”220 
 So, for example, under the conditions facing Singapore, authoritarian constitutionalism 
might be “the best … political arrangement[]” for achieving rapid economic growth – or, as 
suggested earlier, for maintaining ethnic and religious peace. Whether it is would of course 
depend on a careful analysis of the available institutional alternatives. Singapore’s multiethnic 
society might face threats to social order of a different degree than those faced by the United 
States or other more liberal constitutional regimes. In 1964 Singapore, then a member of the 
Federation of Malaysia, experienced two significant episodes of ethnic rioting between Chinese 
and Malay groups. Those conflicts had an important effect on Lee Kuan Yew’s thinking about 
the appropriate institution al design for Singapore. Maintaining social order through restrictions 
on individual liberty was the pragmatic authoritarian constitutionalist response. 
One hint that pragmatism undergirds Singapore’s regime is its use of sedition law. 
Historically, authorities have used sedition law to target regime critics.221 Singapore’s authorities 
use it differently, to target those whose speech threatens to revive ethnic conflict. Perhaps one 
could fairly describe the speech involved in these prosecutions as hate speech or some analog 
thereto. If so, perhaps we should treat Singapore as pushing against the limits of liberal 
                                                 
220 Subramaniam, supra note ---, at 22 (citations omitted). See also RUTHERFORD, supra note ---, 
at 128-30 (describing the ways in which the “vagueness” of Islamic constitutionalism allowed 
the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood to present “a liberal conception of Islamic political order” in 
the 1980s and 1990s). 
221 [citations.] 
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constitutionalism from within. The United States Constitution has been interpreted to place 
substantial limits on hate speech proscriptions,222 but most other liberal democracies have 
reasonably broad bans on hate speech. Those bans might not be not broad enough to cover the 
speech at issue in the Singapore cases, which is why I describe Singapore as pushing against the 
limits, but Singapore’s use of sedition to target “quasi” hate speech does not seem to me 
categorically different from the use of hate speech law in most Western democracies. 
None of this is to deny, of course, that the pragmatic defense of authoritarian 
constitutionalism is ultimately empirical, and that those offering it typically have an interest in 
exaggerating the extent to which their policies secure social peace and economic growth, as 
compared to available alternatives. Yet, even so qualified, the pragmatic defense might give 
authoritarian constitutionalist regimes a degree of normative authority: They achieve socially 
desirable outcomes engaging in the severe intrusions on individual rights characteristic of fully 
authoritarian regimes. 
 
C. The Possible Instability of Authoritarian Constitutional Regimes 
 With the characteristics enumerated earlier, I believe, authoritarian constitutionalism is at 
least as normatively constitutionalist as the absolute monarchy I described. And, though what I 
have described is something like an ideal type, Singapore provides some indication that 
authoritarian constitutionalism is also empirically possible. The pragmatic defense of 
authoritarian constitutionalism introduces a degree of flexibility and adaptability into such 
regimes. Yet, the primary question about authoritarian constitutionalism is whether it describes a 
                                                 
222 See, e.g. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992). 
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regime that can be reasonably stable over a reasonably long period.223 Other than Singapore, 
there are few examples of actual systems that appear to fit the description of authoritarian 
constitutionalism, and some candidates that might have done so at some points have not persisted 
long.224 The PAP’s leadership provides a good example of what William Case describes as the 
                                                 
223 The qualifications are necessary because one cannot demand “permanent” stability of any 
regime, and because I am willing to concede that fully democratic constitutionalist regimes may 
persist for longer periods than other constitutionalist ones, but am not willing to concede that 
such regimes provide the definition of stability we should use. See also Thomas Christiano, An 
Instrumental Argument for a Human Right to Democracy, 39 PHILOSOPHY & PUBLIC AFFAIRS 
142, 157 (2011), which argues that a “consultation hierarchy,” a regime similar to the monarchy I 
have described, “is not impossible; it is just very unlikely” because its stability depends on 
sustained choices by the monarch and his/her successors, which cannot be assured. 
 I put aside as relevant to a different sort of analysis than the one I pursue here the 
question of the social and economic preconditions to authoritarian constitutionalism, but the 
point is almost inevitably made in discussions of Singapore that the nation’s economic success 
under the PAP regime has an important role in sustaining the regime. 
224 For example, the Islamic Republic of Iran prior to the 2009 elections might have qualified as 
an authoritarian constitutionalist regime, but that year’s fraudulent presidential election either 
transformed it into a fully authoritarian regime or confirmed that it was already such a regime. 
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importance of “skill” in designing institutions that sustain authoritarian constitutionalism.225 The 
co-optation mechanisms there are quite cleverly designed.226 
 Instability can be resolved in two directions. An authoritarian constitutionalist regime 
could lose its authoritarian character and become fully constitutionalist,227 or it could lose its 
constitutionalism and become purely authoritarian.228 (a) In addition to the dynamic process 
described earlier in Part ---, the first path might involve something like learning: Toleration of 
some dissent increases so that more dissent emerges and the mechanisms of cooptation expand to 
encompass more people but weaken the commitment the coopted have to the regime’s 
authoritarianism. At some point members of the regime itself see little personal threat in 
                                                 
225 William Case, “Manipulative Skills: How Do Rulers Control the Electoral Arena?, in 
Schedler, supra note ---. 
226 Singapore’s system for compensating high civil servants is another example of design skill 
(coupled with the nation’s economic success). High civil servants receive salaries “pegged to 
economic performance and the salaries of the top echelons of a group of key professional 
classes.” Sree Kumar & Sharon Siddique, The Singapore Success Story: Public-Private Alliance 
for Investment Attraction, Innovation and Export Development (New York: United Nations, 
2010), p. 15.  
227 For a discussion of this possibility, see He & Warren, supra note ---. Levitsky & Way, supra 
note ---, argue that competitive authoritarian nations with strong links to the West – a description 
that fits Singapore – are more likely than other such regimes to democratize. 
228 Cf. Levitsky & Way, supra note ---, at 25-26 (describing the possibility that competitive 
authoritarianism will become stable authoritarianism). 
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abandoning the regime’s authoritarian characteristics at least in part because the emerging 
leaders of the nascent fully constitutionalist regime understand that providing such assurances is 
essential to the transition after which they hope to be the new regime’s leaders.229 
 (b) The transformation to authoritarianism (or mere rule-of-law constitutionalism) might 
itself have several variants. For example, (i) the regime’s leaders might be unable to transmit a 
normative commitment to consultation and responsiveness to their successors.230 The successors 
become increasingly less responsive and deal with increasing dissatisfaction through repression 
and violence. Or, (ii) the regime’s leaders face increasing public dissatisfaction but cannot obtain 
                                                 
229 I include the regime members’ inheritable wealth within the items they might be concerned 
about. So, they do not anticipate confiscation of that wealth either directly or when passed on to 
their heirs. 
230 One question about the Singaporean example is the extent to which it is parasitic on the 
special intellectual and charismatic characteristics of Lee Kuan Yew, the nation’s leader since 
independence (a leadership that was formal for many years and now is informal, with Lee Kwan 
Yew serving until 2011 in the nonstatutory post of Minister Mentor). Notably, the current Prime 
Minister is Lee Kuan Yew’s son. Put in more general terms, Lee Kuan Yew’s overwhelming role 
has meant that the PAP has not had to face severe problems of leadership succession and the 
possibility of intra-elite competition for leadership. 
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assurances that they would not suffer severe losses were they to leave office. To avoid those 
losses, they repress dissent.231 
The literature on what political scientists call electoral or competitive authoritarian 
regimes suggests one important constraint on the unraveling of constitutions in authoritarian 
regimes, and provides a way to conclude the discussion of the possibility of a relatively stable 
authoritarian constitutionalism. Andreas Schedler defines electoral authoritarianism: “[E]lections 
are broadly inclusive … as well as minimally pluralistic …, minimally competitive …, and 
minimally open.”232 For Beatriz Magaloni, “hegemonic-party systems allow opposition parties to 
challenge the incumbent party through multiparty elections.”233 Electoral authoritarian or 
hegemonic-party regimes are assured of victory in these elections. But, Magaloni emphasizes, 
not just victory – the dominant party in a dominant-party regime is assured of victory – but 
landslide yet minimally manipulated victories: “[H]egemonic-party systems are far more 
overpowering that predominant-party systems, usually controlling more than 65 percent of the 
legislative seats – so that they can change the constitution unilaterally, without the need for forge 
                                                 
231 Again, I put to one side other origins of a transformation into authoritarianism such as defeat 
in a foreign adventure or severe economic stress, whether caused by regime missteps or 
exogenously. 
232 Schedler, supra note ---, at 382. 
233 MAGALONI, supra note ---, at 32. 
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coalitions with opposition parties. This implies that there is no binding set of constitutional 
rules….”234  
The risk of unraveling occurs precisely because there is no such set. And yet, the 
existence of more-or-less real elections indicates that these regimes are not fully authoritarian. 
Again, political scientists can offer instrumental accounts for conducting elections, but such 
accounts have the same vulnerabilities as instrumental accounts of other neutral institutions. So, 
for example, Magaloni identifies these functions: Elections “are designed to establish a 
regularized method to share power among ruling party politicians[,] … to disseminate public 
information about the regime’s strength that would serve to discourage potential divisions within 
the ruling party[,] … to provide information about supporters and opponents of the regime[,] … 
[and] to trap the opposition, so that it invests in the existing autocratic institutions rather than 
challenging them by violent means.”235 As I have argued, these functions could be served by 
other institutional mechanisms, as for example occurs in the authoritarian People’s Republic of 
China. With autocratic control, more-or-less real elections will occur when, but only when, they 
produce the kinds of massive victories that give the regime control over the processes for 
modifying the constitution. 
The main contribution of the scholarly literature on competitive or electoral 
authoritarianism to an inquiry into authoritarian constitutionalism is its focus on elections that 
are open, competitive, and pluralistic, though minimally so, according to Schedler. They must be 
                                                 
234 Id. at 35. See also id. at 259-61 (describing how hegemonic-party control in Mexico produced 
“the [e]ndogeneity of the Constitution”). 
235 Id. at 9-10. 
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only minimally so lest the authoritarian regime become simply a liberal democracy with a 
dominant party. All the accounts make electoral manipulation a feature of these regimes. Yet, as 
Schedler and Magaloni note, while it is easy to distinguish “mere” manipulation from gross fraud 
and intimidation, it is much more difficult to distinguish it from the ordinary practices of 
politicians in liberal democracies.236 Schedler enumerates “the enactment of discriminatory 
election laws, the repression of protest marches, [and] the exclusion of candidates from the ballot 
by administrative fiat” as mechanisms to ensure massive victories. But, he continues, because 
“people may differ in their concrete definitions of democratic minimum standards, … the frontier 
between electoral democracy and electoral authoritarianism represents essentially contested 
terrain.”237 Similarly, Magaloni observes that “the ruling party can commit electoral fraud or 
threaten to repress its opponents,” but criticizes Schedler for treating as “manipulations” 
behavior that “can also take place in systems that we normally regard as democratic,” such as 
“‘self-serving rules of representation granting them a decisive edge when votes are translated 
into seats.’”238 
Return now to Singapore for some examples. (1) Manipulation affecting opposition 
candidates. As noted earlier, Singapore’s Constitution bars from the Parliament anyone who “is 
                                                 
236 A good account of electoral manipulations in the United States is Samuel Issacharoff & 
Richard Pildes, Politics as Markets: Partisan Lockups of the Democratic Process, 50 STAN. L. 
REV. 643 (1998). 
237 Schedler, supra note ---, at 385. 
238 MAGALONI, supra note ---, at 19, 33-34 (quoting Schedler, Elections Without Victory: The 
Menu of Manipulation, 13 J. DEMOCRACY 36, 45 (2002)). 
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an undischarged bankrupt.”239 The PAP intimidates the opposition not by arresting opponents for 
political offenses or on fake charges, but by suing them for libel. Using what Levitsky and Way 
describe in a different context as “colonial-era” libel laws,240 the PAP’s leaders obtained 
substantial judgments based on publications fairly treated under the libel laws as libelous 
statements about the crass motivations of politicians promoting the PAP’s policies. Notably, J.B. 
Jeyaretnam, a prominent opposition leader, twice lost his seat in Parliament, once after being 
convicted of a financial offense in connection with his party’s funds and once for failing to pay 
damages to PAP leaders for libeling them.241 The libel laws Singapore’s leaders use to intimidate 
the opposition are indeed old-fashioned, and almost certainly not in tune with standards that 
prevail even outside the United States with its especially severe restrictions on libel law as 
applied to public figures. Yet certainly taken on their own, and probably even in connection with 
Singapore’s wider system of regulating expression, Singapore’s libel laws seem within the 
bounds of liberal constitutionalism – as might be suggested by the fact that other common-law 
                                                 
239 Constitution of Singapore, art. 45 (1)(b). 
240 Levitsky & Way, supra note ---, at 58 (referring to the use of similar laws by Jerry Rawlings 
in Ghana). See also Levitsky & Way, supra note ---, at 9 (describing “the widespread … use of 
libel or defamation laws against journalists, editors, and media outlets.”). 
241 Seth Mydans, “J.B. Jeyaretnam, Persistent Opposition Figure in Singapore, Is Dead at 82,” 
New York Times, Oct. 3, 2008. CHRIS LYDGATE, LEE’S LAW: HOW SINGAPORE CRUSHES 
DISSENT (2003), is an admiring biography of Jeyaretnam. 
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nations used quite similar rules until relatively recently and were at those times rather clearly 
liberal constitutional states anyway.242 
(2) “Gerrymandering.” Manipulation of constituency boundaries – classical 
gerrymandering – is of course possible in liberal democracies as well as in other regimes.243A 
related example of electoral manipulation well short of fraud is Singapore’s GRCs.244 Whatever 
their possible good-government rationales, the GRCs serve to impede opposition electoral 
success. A charismatic or otherwise extremely popular opposition candidate might win in a 
single-member district, but might find it more difficult to carry the whole list to victory in a 
GRC: One charismatic candidate and two dull ones might lose to a PAP slate of three solid but 
unexciting candidates.245 The GRCs appear to explain the dramatic translation of substantial but 
                                                 
242 For another example, see Anil Kalhan, “Gray Zone” Constitutionalism and the Dilemma of 
Judicial Independence in Pakistan, 46 VAND. J. TRANSN'L L. ---, --- (2013) (describing the 
creation of a requirement that members of Parliament hold college degrees). 
243 See ANDREW HARDING, THE CONSTITUTIONAL OF MALAYSIA: A CONTEXTUAL ANALYSIS 91 
(2012) (describing classical gerrymandering in Malaysia). 
244 See Thio, supra note ---, at 47 (referring to the GRC system as “gerrymandering”). 
245 The GRCs also help the PAP in recruiting candidates who might be reluctant to put 
themselves forward without assurances of success. Those assurances can be provided by putting 
the candidate on a slate headed by a popular minister. See Li-Ann Thio, “In Search of the 
Singapore Constitution: Retrospect and Prospect, in EVOLUTION OF A REVOLUTION: FORTY 
YEARS OF THE SINGAPORE CONSTITUTION 323, 328-29 (Li-Ann Thio & Kevin Y.L. Tan eds., 
2009). 
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not overwhelming victories in the popular vote into overwhelming predominance in the 
legislature.246 
(3) “Pork barrel” spending. Finally, William Case argues that the leaders of the 
Malaysian electorally authoritarian regime engage in vote-buying by providing supporters with 
valuable benefits such as “on-the-spot ‘development grants’ for new clinics, paved roads, or 
mosques.”247 Similarly, “Singapore’s government has threatened to cut off state funding for 
public housing upgrades in those districts where opposition candidates win.”248 Magaloni puts 
                                                 
246 See also HARDING, supra note ---, at 86 (noting the electoral distortion in Malaysia, where a 
majority of 50.27% translated into 140 legislative seats, 46.75% into 82 seats). The limited 
period in which formal campaigning for office is allowed – nine days – should also be mentioned 
here, as a design feature that limits the opposition’s opportunity for publicizing its position. See 
SEOW, supra note ---, at 36 (making this point). In the United States, the franking privilege 
available to sitting members of Congress provides them with a similar structural advantage in 
disseminating their positions, at least in connection with constituent services. 
247 Case, supra note ---, at 103. See also HARDING, supra note --- at 143-44 (describing the 
national government’s cancellation of oil and gas royalties scheduled to be paid to a state 
governed by the opposition party). 
248 Id. at 104. See also Thio, supra note ---, at 30-31 (describing a speech made by Prime 
Minister Goh in 2001 stating that precincts that cast more than 50% of the vote for the PAP 
“would enjoy priority in upgrading programmes.”). Note that Case and Goh (quoted by Thio) 
refer to denying upgrades, not withdrawal of existing subsidies. See also HARDING, supra note --
-, at 92 (noting “threats of economic sanctions for areas returning opposition candidates”). 
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the point more generally: “[T]he ruling party monopolizes the state’s resources and employs 
them to reward voter loyalty and to punish voter defection.”249 From another perspective, 
though, these are examples of ordinary pork-barrel politics or credit-claiming by elected 
politicians in liberal democracies.250 
                                                 
249 MAGALONI, supra note ---, at 19. See also DODSON, supra note ---, at 123, 126 (describing 
forms of withdrawing public resources from opposition-led areas in Venezuela). 
250 With respect to Singapore, after the United States Department of State expressed concern 
over Lee’s statement that “constituencies that elect opposition candidates will receive low 
priority in extensive government plans to upgrade public housing facilities,” a major figure in the 
PAP “professed surprise that the Americans ‘should raise an issue about how we run democratic 
politics in Singapore when their pork-barrel politics is something of a long tradition.” FANCIS T. 
SEOW, BEYOND SUSPICION? THE SINGAPORE JUDICIARY 29-40 (2006). Cf. Fernanda Brollo & 
Tommaso Nannicini, Tying Your Enemy’s Hands in Close Races: The Politics of Federal 
Transfers in Brazil, 106 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 742 (2012) (finding that the national government 
“punishes” municipalities led by mayors from opposition parties by giving them smaller 
discretionary transfers than are given to municipalities led by mayors from the governing 
coalition). The standard citation for credit-claiming is DAVID MAYHEW, CONGRESS: THE 
ELECTORAL CONNECTION (1974). See also James A. Robinson & Ragnar Torvik, White 
Elephants, 89 J. PUB. ECON. 197 (2004) (providing a formal model of inefficient pork barrel 
spending as a technique used to provide credible commitments to constituents, thereby giving 
them a reason to vote for the incumbent party). 
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These examples illustrate the difficulty in distinguishing electoral manipulations in 
hybrid regimes from ordinary politics in liberal constitutional ones.251  After several pages 
seeking to distinguish competitive authoritarianism from pure authoritarianism and democracy, 
Levitsky and Way find themselves offering a summary of the “level of uncertainty” associated 
with competitive authoritarian elections: The level is “[l]ower than democracy but higher than 
full authoritarianism.”252At some point, of course, matters of degree become matters of kind, and 
the cumulative and perhaps interactive effects of several types of manipulation might exceed 
even a rather extensive exercise of an individual type in a liberal democratic regime. But, 
perhaps we should consider some hybrid regimes as falling within the domain of normative 
constitutionalism. 
                                                 
251 I note my sense that some of the work on hybrid regimes trades on failing to distinguish 
sharply enough between electoral fraud and electoral manipulation, evoking images of fraud to 
motivate analyses that describe systems that are of particular interest because only manipulation 
occurs. For examples, see MAGALONI, supra note ---, at 18 (“A third instrument hegemonic 
parties employ to deter party splits is raising the costs of entry to potential challengers by … 
threatening to commit electoral fraud against them and to use the army to enforce such fraud.”); 
Levitsky & Way, supra note ---, at 52-53 (“Incumbents violate … rules so often and to such an 
extent … that the regime fails to meet conventional minimum standards for democracy…. 
Members of the opposition may be jailed, exiled, or --- less frequently – even assaulted or 
murdered.”). In contrast, see MAGALONI, supra, at 21 (Figure 1.1, identifying a category in 
which there is “[n]o need for electoral fraud”).  
252 Levitsky & Way, supra note ---, at 13. 
109 
 
 
VI. Conclusion 
 Singapore is not a bad place to live even for dissidents from the regime. They might 
suffer relatively low levels of government harassment, be deprived of access to some significant 
government benefits, and the like, but few are hounded into exile or and even fewer thrown 
arbitrarily in jail. Yet, of course, it is not a liberal democracy. From a normative point of view 
the central question, probably unanswerable now, is whether a Singapore without authoritarian 
constitutionalism would be a liberal democracy or a fully authoritarian state. If the latter, 
authoritarian constitutionalism may be normatively attractive for Singapore.  
There may well be additional forms of normatively constitutionalist systems that are not 
fully constitutionalist.253 I hope that these observations will contribute to a more sustained 
consideration both of additional conceptual possibilities and, in my view more important, of 
cases in which we can observe something other than authoritarianism and full normative 
constitutionalism. I believe that there are such cases, and that examining them would shed light 
                                                 
253 To adapt a well-known line concluding another, far more important paper, it has not escaped 
my notice that the argument developed here might support the proposition that the United States 
does not have a fully constitutionalist system. Cf. CHARLES E. LINDBLOM, POLITICS AND 
MARKETS: THE WORLD’S POLITICAL-ECONOMIC SYSTEMS 356 (1977) (“The large public 
corporation fits oddly into democratic theory and vision. Indeed, it does not fit.”). 
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not only on questions of institutional design within a normatively constitutionalist framework but 
on normative constitutionalism itself.254 
                                                 
254 One promising candidate for examination in the service of pluralizing the idea of 
constitutionalism are the post-Communist nations of central and eastern Europe. They are often 
described as “transitional,” yet, as the political science literature suggests, supra note ---, that 
term might be inapt in light of the persistence of the “transiton.” Seeing these nations as 
exemplifying a distinctive form of constitutionalism, we might be able to develop some analytic 
purchase on their characteristics. For example, Wojciech Sadurski’s study suggests that 
constitutional courts in the post-communist nations have done a better job in adjudicating 
individual rights claims than in dealing with issues of separation of powers. WOJCIECH 
SADURSKI, RIGHTS BEFORE COURTS: A STUDY OF CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS IN POSTCOMMUNIST 
STATES OF CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE (2005). Lee Epstein, Jack Knight & Olga Shvetsova, 
The Role of Constitutional Courts in the Establishment and Maintenance of Democratic Systems 
of Government, 45  L. & SOCIETY REV. 117 (2001), offers an analytic framework that might begin 
to account for this pattern. 
